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 The theory of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) proposes to answer important questions 
regarding the connections between economic growth (development) and the environment.  The theory 
postulates the environment need not always suffer as the economy develops, and it has generated strong 
support and opposition.  Rather than attempting to defend or debunk EKC theory, this research challenges a 
practice engaged in by proponents and opponents alike.  Simplifying assumptions are a necessary part of 
economic analysis, but this research shows that any assumptions may not be universally applicable.  
Utilizing, in turn, a simple one-good model and then a more complicated two-good model, it is discovered 
that the competing assumptions utilized by proponents a d opponents of the EKC theory may both be valid, 
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 Is there a destructive link between economic growth and the health of the environment?  Has 
history determined the one will always be at the expense of the other?  If so, what does it mean for 
economic and environmental policies?  Can they be created to support growth without compromising the 
environment?  The theory of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC)1 has been proposed as a partial 
answer to these questions.  EKC theory proposes that degradation of the environment need not always be 
the result of economic growth.  Instead, this theory postulates that once a society has obtained some level 
of national income, the environment should begin to improve as incomes continue to rise, through changes 
in consumption, changes in production, or both.2  If the theory is correct, then it may be possible to achieve 
both a high standard of living and a clean environme t; if incorrect, then the global environment may 
further degrade, despite economic development, until the earth’s capacity for sustaining life has been 
exhausted.  This research proposes to further our understanding of the accuracy of the theory by advancing 
the sophistication of dynamic modeling of the theory. 
 A vigorous debate has arisen with regard to the validity of the EKC theory and its applicability to 
real-world data.  Several economists have provided th oretical and empirical support for EKC theory, such 
as Grossman and Kreuger (1991, 1995), Lucas et al. (1992), and Selden and Song (1994), yet just as many 
have questioned whether or not this phenomenon exists, such as Stern et al. (1996) and Ali Khan (1997).  
Existing literature has examined the empirical data, offering opposing views on whether the data represents 
an outcome predicted by EKC theory and proposing theoretical explanations for the empirical results.  The 
                                                
 1 So named because of similarities to the work of Simon Kuznets (1955, 1963).  Kuznets posited an inverted-
U relationship between rising incomes and income inequality.  He concluded that countries with rising comes would 
see political power and income increasingly concentrated in a small portion of society.  That concentration would 
continue until incomes had risen to a certain level, after which a middle class would begin to develop, which would 
dissipate the concentration of political power and i come, leading to a more equal distribution of both among the 
population as incomes continue to rise. 
 2 As attitudes towards environmental quality change, individuals change their consumption, and producers 
begin producing environmentally friendly products.  This change in attitude toward the environment is often attributed 
to environmental amenities being a normal good.  However, in the presence of diminishing marginal utility for all 
goods, the same result is possible under the weaker assumption of normality, as discussed in McConnell (1997).  Kelly 




ongoing debate surrounding the potential for an EKC has greatly advanced our understanding of how 
economic development and environmental quality might be linked, but questions remain.  
For example, EKC theory3 was generated in response to a long-standing debate over whether 
environmental problems can be solved without direct government intervention, or whether the process of 
economic development may be sufficient to protect the environment.  However, most experts, with 
relatively few exceptions, agree that while increased income will result in an individual’s increased demand 
for a clean environment, an actual reduction in enviro mental degradation will occur only as government 
reacts to the collective demand for environmental qu lity.4  Direct government action may be required as a 
catalyst for an EKC, or perhaps the necessary changes can begin if the government’s role is limited to 
providing appropriate incentives. 
 One possible link between individual demand and government action is an open democratic 
process (Torras and Boyce, 1998 and Pfaff et al., 2001).  In the United States, the democratic process ha  
resulted in several environmental policies, including the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Acid Rain 
Act,5 and reductions in the amount of public lands open to logging.  Critics of the democratic process say it 
moves too slowly to effectively protect the environment; fragile ecosystems can be destroyed while 
democratic processes march on towards a definitive conclusion.  However, others defend democratic means 
as a necessary trade-off between protection of the environment and individual freedoms; if the environment 
is to be protected, it should be because individuals in society care about the future and wish it to be so. 
 Data for the United States is, for the most part, mixed.  Several measures show reductions in the 
total level of environmental degradation over the period of 1970 to 2000: emissions of most airborne 
pollutants declined;6 water quality improved in many categories;7 and total land forested in the United 
                                                
 3 The existence of an EKC was first proposed by Grossman and Kreuger (1991).  The authors did not give the 
phenomenon the name “Environmental Kuznets Curve,” but they were the first to formally postulate a quadratic 
relationship between national income and pollution. 
 4 Two prominent exceptions are Beckerman (1992) and Panayotou (1997).  Aubourg et al. (2008) provide 
empirical evidence that greater freedom results in a flatter EKC for carbon dioxide. 
 5 Title VII of the Energy Security Act of 1980 [P.L. 96-294]. 
 6 USEPA, National Air Pollutant Emission Trends, 1900–1998, EPA-454/R-00-002, U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, Research Triangle Park, NC. March 2000 




States increased after almost a century of decline.8  These statistics, combined with the rise in U.S. incomes 
for the same three decades, might lead a casual observer to conclude that EKC theory is accurately 
describing the empirical data.  However, other pollutants, primarily greenhouse gas emissions, have been
increasing over the same period.  These discrepancies preclude any blanket assumption regarding the 
empirical accuracy of EKC theory and raise certain interesting questions: Does EKC theory apply only to 
certain measures of degradation?  Hasn’t the threshold level of income been reached for greenhouse gass?  
Are there other factors or phenomena at work? 
 These questions are complicated further by other complex issues, such as trade.  Wealthier 
countries may create “pollution havens” reducing their environmental degradation by exporting polluting 
(“dirty”) industries to poorer countries.  For example, the United States may increase imports of steel rather 
than produce it domestically, thus reducing domestic emissions of sulfur dioxide; the United States may 
similarly increase its imports of lumber, reducing domestic deforestation.  These actions would induce an 
apparent domestic EKC, but would result in greater d gradation of the global environment.  Of course, 
global degradation is not guaranteed under these conditi ns, but it can certainly be compounded, especially 
if a developed country turns to under-developed countries for the production of “dirty” goods and 
ultimately consumes more dirty goods than if all production remained domestic.  In that case, more total
production of the “dirty” goods leads to greater degradation of the global environment.   
Global degradation may be greater still if the technology in underdeveloped nations is deemed 
“dirtier” than similar technologies in developed countries.  For example, if the steel-producing technologies 
of under-developed countries are less advanced than t ose employed by the United States, then the 
resulting pollution may cancel any benefits the United States may receive for exporting that industry.  
Conversely, if the technology is cleaner, the decrease in pollution per unit of output may lead to a lower 
level of total degradation.   
Complex issues such as this are natural ingredients of economic analysis.  EKC theory combines 
the very complex processes of economics, trade and the environment, and the answer to whether EKC 
theory is correct may be much more than a theoretical concern.  What to the casual observer seems an 
                                                
 8 USDA, U.S. Forest Facts and Historical Trends, FS-696 M, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, 




esoteric concern may instead directly impact the future well-being of every human being, through both 
economic and environmental processes. 
 Within the rich debate that has arisen surrounding these important issues, certain common 
assumptions are regularly used.  Assumptions are commonplace in economics, and for good 
reason--assumptions allow for modeling of complex systems in a way that allows us to understand basic 
relationships much better.  Without assumptions, much of economics study would be impossible or at least 
extremely difficult.  However, the information we are able to glean from our models is only as good as the 
accuracy of our assumptions.  In the EKC literature, assumptions are made regarding how society will react 
to such things as changes in the fixed or variable cost of abatement methods, or changes in society’s tastes 
and preferences for consumption versus a clean environment.  Most assumptions seem perfectly logical and 
intuitive,9 and may be successful in predicting outcomes over a significant range of parameter and variable 
values.  However, due to the complex nature of the economic and environmental systems which need to 
interact to create EKC phenomena, it is possible that t e assumptions may not be universal─they may not 
hold under certain plausible circumstances. 
This research utilizes single- and dual-good models to test whether certain assumptions regarding 
changes in parameter values yield expected results.  Chapter 2 traces the evolutionary steps of EKC theory 
from the early 1970s through today, discussing improvements in both the empirical and theoretical 
literature and providing an overview of the current literature.  Chapter 3 uses both a simple continuous-
time, deterministic variant of the Kelly (2003) model, as well as a discrete time, deterministic model, to test 
whether the intuitive assumptions utilized by Kelly and others hold up under reasonable conditions.  We
discover that even a simple model is sufficiently complex that predicting the results of parameter change is 
troublesome.  Specifically, we discover that there are competing effects to many parameter changes, similar 
to income and price effects.  We also discover that c nges in certain parameters can cause initial increases 
in pollution, but long-term decreases in pollution, a  indication that the time paths of variables need not 
shift uniformly up or down as parameters changes. 
                                                
 9 Of course, not all assumptions are created equal--M ddison (2006) criticizes the implicit assumption that 




Chapter 4 extends the model by incorporating the capa ity of society to choose between “green” 
and “dirty” production and consumption, as an additional means by which society may choose to improve 
its environment.  Once again, we find that intuitive and commonly used assumptions do not hold under 
plausible circumstances, offering an additional word f caution in relying on these assumptions.  The 
difficulty in predicting with certainty the effect of parameter change suggests that the nature of thesyst mic 
reaction to parameter change may be highly dependent upon the characteristics of individual pollutants,10 
the relative values to society of consumption and evironmental amenities at a given point in time, etc.  
This potential for variation in the systemic reaction to parameter change may help explain why the current 
debate has been unable to reach a consensus.  Chapter 5 concludes this analysis and presents possible 
avenues for further research.   
This dissertation is not intended to be a final answer to the EKC question but rather a word of 
caution to fellow researchers into the mechanics of an EKC.  Moreover, it is intended as a word of caution 
to all who intend to effect environmental change within their countries and in the world, for this research 
indicates that common-sense assumptions may not be corr ct in all circumstances.  This research indicates 
that environmental improvement will not be achieved in the same way in all countries, and that achieving 
desired environmental improvements will require policymakers and other interested parties to carefully 
tailor environmental policies to the particular circumstances of their nation and region. 
                                                
 10 The fact that different pollutants have different characteristics is not surprising, but some researchers 
assume that a valid point with regard to one pollutant holds universally for all pollutants.  As an example, Wagner 
(2008) argues that econometric attempts to prove the existence of an EKC for carbon dioxide are flawed.  Once those 
arguments are made, however, Wagner assumes that his arguments are equally valid as against the existence of an EKC 









EKC theory has evolved over several decades from its initial intuitive conception to the complex 
theoretical models of today.  Like all theories, EKC theory has had a number of iterations, as individual 
contributions have been proposed and either accepted or rejected.  These contributions began in the past
century with a general concern over whether post-WWII growth patterns could continue without destroying 
the environment.  Through successive steps of empirical and theoretical debate, a quadratic relationship 
between income and environmental degradation has been proposed, criticized, defended, and criticized 
again.   
Along the way, the shortcomings of each iteration have been pointed out and elaborated upon by 
those not sharing the same view.  This process of point-counterpoint has generally improved the quality of 
subsequent analyses, and brought us closer to a clearer understanding of the relationship between economic 
growth and environmental quality.  However, in many ways the underlying questions of EKC theory 
remain unresolved.  This chapter presents, in brief form, representative works from each iterative step, 
outlining their contributions to our present understanding of EKC phenomena, as well as highlighting those 
aspects which were thought lacking by observers, critics, and sometimes supporters. 
 
2.1.  Genesis of the growth/environment debate 
 An important first step in the evolution of the EKC theory was the development of a growth versus 
environmental quality debate.  Common sense informs us that living on a planet with a finite volume 
introduces resource constraints, and the lengthy process by which productive resources are generated and 
renewed only serves to strengthen that constraint.  A y society living on this planet can be expected to face 
some form of debate over when that constraint will become binding; in other words, it is likely that every 
forward-looking society on earth will engage in a growth versus environmental quality debate.   
One of the first examples of such a debate in modern western civilization was Thomas Malthus 
(1890), who expresses concern over humanity’s ability to feed itself when population grew geometrically 




concerns over finite resources and potentially infin te resource demand remain valid to the extent that 
mankind continues to inhabit a world with finite resources. 
 In the centuries between Malthus and 1970, the growth versus environment debate certainly 
continued, and it gained strength in the wake of the unprecedented growth experienced by the United States 
after World War II.  There began to be call for curbs to economic growth in order to protect the 
environment out of fear that uncontrolled economic growth would lead to exhaustion of natural resources 
and deterioration of air and water quality.11  Ruttan (1971) responds to these calls with a reminder that 
technological advancement has the potential to help the environment cope with continued economic 
growth.  If applied correctly, technical forces could allow economic growth to continue without necessarily 
destroying the environment. 
The debate that persisted through most of the 1970s can best be exemplified by the works of 
Meadows et al. (1972) and Beckerman (1972).  Meadows et al. (1972) predicted that the exponential rate of 
economic growth would lead to overpopulation and the exhaustion of environmental stocks and natural 
resources; this, in turn, would bring economic growth to a halt.  Beckerman (1972) responded, stating that 
poor societies would never be able to afford abatement or clean-up costs, making economic growth a 
requirement for a cleaner environment:  greater growth provides necessary public and private funds to 
achieve environmental improvements. 
 Many related Meadows’ predictions to those of Malthus more than two centuries before, and, in 
the end, Meadows’ predictions were not realized either.12  Technological change has apparently allowed the 
world to avoid Malthus’ and Meadows’ predictions.  However, as Radetzki (1992) notes, technological 
advances may not continue indefinitely, so we may not be able to rely on it to save us every time: 
The purported environmental threat posed by economic growth cannot 
be waved away by pointing to the failures of earlier doomsday 
prophets.  After all, the current world economy is far larger than 20 or 
                                                
 11 Ruttan (1971), p. 707.  
 12 In Beyond the Limits, Meadows et al. (1992) state that they were not predicting anything, merely laying 
before the world choices of alternative paths that the human race could follow.  They also stress thatwhile 
technological progress may have extended the time during which present consumption levels are possible, humanity 
had already overshot Earth’s capacity to support humanity in the long run.  In Limits to Growth: The 30 Year Update 
(Meadows et al., 2004), they again issue their challenge to humanity to find a way to return to a sustainable level of 





200 years ago, so the probability of hitting against one or other resource 
constraint could be greater than in earlier periods. (p. 121)  
 
Still, Radetzki also notes that most of the changes to the environment over time have been beneficial to 
mankind with relatively few negative spillover effects.  Neither Beckerman nor Meadows could claim 
complete victory in the debate; economic growth continued mostly unabated, yet the environmental effects 
have been mixed through the 1970s and 1980s.  The debate, however, was far from ended. 
 
2.2.  First empirical studies 
 As economic growth progressed through the 1980s, so did the debate over whether such growth 
could be maintained without permanent damage to the environment.13  In an attempt to shed light on the 
link between economic growth and the environment, the World Bank commissioned a study in the early 
1990s; the goal of the study was to determine what effect free trade had on the environment during the 
1980s.  The economists tasked with completing the study, Grossman and Kreuger (1991) found evidence to 
suggest that the economic gains from trade do not result in harm to the environment.  They discover that an 
inverted-U relationship appears to exist between rising incomes and environmental degradation, a 
relationship which later came to be known as the Enviro mental Kuznets Curve. 
EKC theory is premised on the notion that, for a time, environmental degradation increases as 
incomes rise; however, at a certain income level, that rend changes and degradation decreases while 
incomes rise.  Grossman and Kreuger (1991) are followed by numerous other studies that show similar 
results.  Birdsall and Wheeler (1992) show that countries with more open trade policies saw environmental 
quality increase as well as incomes; dirty industrie  did appear to migrate to poorer countries, but clean 
industries appeared to migrate at an even faster rat ; and large corporations in clean industries pushed for 
higher environmental standards in both wealthy and poor countries.  Grossman and Kreuger (1995) find 
inverted-U relationships for a number of measures of environmental degradation, estimating the turning 
point of annual per-capita income at approximately $8,000.  While they admit that it is unclear whether the 
estimated relationship does, in fact, exist, they blieve that such empirical studies were “an important first 
                                                
 13 Two good sources for data regarding development are he World Development Indicators, available from 





step” (p. 360). 
Subsequent studies have expressed a similar inability to draw firm conclusions regarding a causal 
relationship between economic growth and environmental degradation.  Lucas et al. (1992) found 
inverted-U relationships between income and per-unit-of-output toxic releases of 320 different air, water, 
and ground pollutants.14  They offer a caution that this does not guarantee a d cline in aggregate pollution 
levels, but such a phenomenon would be required if an EKC were to exist.  Selden and Song (1994) 
estimate an EKC for various air pollutants, yet issue a reminder that while the long-run promises lower 
pollution, the nature of an EKC promises higher short-run pollution levels, and that there is no guarantee 
that those higher short-run levels will not be devastating to the environment.  Shafik (1994) estimates a 
purely negative relationship between income and some measures of environmental degradation; a purely 
positive relationship for other measures; and EKCs for yet others.15  He states that when the societal costs 
of environmental degradation are internalized,16 abatement occurs rapidly, but if costs are externalized then 
abatement may never occur. 
 These first empirical studies set the stage for further debate.  They were, in many respects, overly 
simplified in their assumptions, and approached an inherently dynamic process from a purely static 
viewpoint.  As discussed below, there were also methodological concerns with these initial attempts.  In 
spite of their weaknesses, however, these EKC pioneers offered a sufficiently convincing argument that 
many economists were drawn into the debate in order to correct errors in an important area of research. 
 
2.3.  Rebuttals to empirical studies 
 In response to the first empirical studies, many economists and ecologists disputed the possibility 
of a positive empirical relationship between income and environmental quality.  List and Gallet (1999), 
                                                
 14 A decrease in pollution per unit of output is merely a short-term victory, for increases in total output may 
cause total pollution to rise.  On the other hand, a short-term increase in total output and, therefore, pollution, may 
eventually yield to a trend towards increasingly lower per-unit of output pollution levels. 
 15 Lack of safe water, lack of urban sanitation, and dissolved oxygen in rivers exhibit a purely negative 
relationship; municipal solid waste per capita and carbon emissions per capita exhibit a purely positive relationship; 
and annual deforestation, total deforestation, suspended particulate matter, ambient sulfur dioxide, and fecal coliform in 
rivers (the latter is a cubic, rather than quadratic, relationship) exhibit an inverted-U relationship. 
 16 Internalization of pollution’s harmful effects is more likely when those effects are concentrated locally, as 




Munasinghe (1999), De Bruyn et al. (1998), and Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh (2005)17 all criticize EKC 
theorists for their implicit assumption that every country must pass through a similar development path.18  
Due to the diffusion of technology to lesser develop d nations, there is no reason to expect one EKC to 
describe the path all developing nations would take, s a poor country today could learn from the mistakes 
of countries like the United States and Great Britain.  Rothman (1998) criticizes the focus of initial 
empirical studies on production changes, stressing that the microeconomic behavior of individual economic 
actors, both productive and consumptive, would be a determining factor in the development of an EKC 
over time. 
 Others have rejected the notion that income determin s pollution and have suggested alternatives.  
For example, Kaufmann et al. (1998) offer spatial intensity of economic activity as an alternate causal 
variable, proposing a relationship between the concentration of economic activity in urban areas and 
atmospheric levels of sulfur dioxide; Unruh and Moomaw (1998) provide some evidence that historical 
events, such as wars, treaties, etc., correlate closely with changes in pollution levels, and might more 
accurately explain decreases in pollution; Magnani (2000) stresses the need to include income disparity 
measures; and Suri and Chapman (1998) utilize energy consumption as an explanatory variable in EKC 
regression analysis.  The latter study indicates that developed nations may see improvements in 
environmental quality as incomes rise only because they are importing pollution-intensive goods from 
developing nations.  Their results suggest that free t ade, rather than offering a solution for environmental 
problems, is likely to exacerbate them. 
 Substantial criticism of the first empirical studies, such as Grossman and Kreuger (1991, 1995), 
has also come from those who generally accept all the theoretical foundations of EKC theory.  For 
example, Arrow et al. (1995) claim that the environment can only handle a certain level of pollution before 
its capacity to repair itself is gone.  They state that while countries likely do progress through an EKC-like 
pattern, high levels of pollution during the transition may permanently damage the environment, indicating 
                                                
 17 Specifically, Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh (2005) point out that moving to panel data sets, rather than simple 
cross-sectional analysis, has some benefits, but arg e that if the model does not allow for heterogeneity, the analysis 
will remain fundamentally flawed. 
 18 In fact, some argue, as did Pearce (2005), that over-emphasis on the EKC results in infliction of 





that any future reductions in pollution may not result in improvements to environmental quality.  Mazznti 
et al. (2007) criticize as being of limited usefulness the use of cross-country analysis while, at the same 
time, providing evidence through the use of panel data that an EKC is likely for a number of pollutants.  
Stern (1998) criticize the early debate for its unde focus on exploring empirical regularities among a large 
set of variables, rather than attempting to gain insight into the underlying mechanics of an EKC theoretical 
foundation. 
 These criticisms, from friend and foe alike, caused proponents of EKC theory to rethink their 
approach, yielding greater attention to methodological detail, a slow shift towards theoretical research, and 
inclusion of a greater number of variables. 
 
2.4.  Second generation empirical studies 
 One response to criticisms has been the development of more complex and inclusive empirical 
models to test for EKC-like phenomena.  Hettige et al. (2000) expand the number of independent and 
dependent variables tested, and find an inverted-U relationship between  income and the share of industrial 
production in national output, as well as a negative relationship between  income and both end-of-pipe 
pollution intensity and share of all polluting sectors in industrial output.  All of this seems to indicate the 
possibility that rising incomes could cause a decrease in degradation, leading to the possible development 
of an EKC.  However, it is also possible that total industrial output will increase, even as its share of total 
GDP shrinks.  Additionally, increases in total output can outweigh reductions in per-unit pollution.  As
such, a “race to the bottom” scenario, where polluti n continues to rise, is still possible.   
Wheeler (2001) also investigates the “race to the bottom” and “pollution haven” hypotheses.  With 
respect to the latter, poorer countries do not have high enough incomes to demand higher environmental 
quality, and thus attract polluting industries from more affluent countries.  Wheeler shows that air quality is 
improving in developed and developing nations, and concludes that informal regulation of air quality exists 
even where formal regulation has not been adopted.  Cole (2004) finds some evidence of pollution havens, 
but only for some pollutants, and the evidence appered to be of limited significance. 
 Anderson (2001) provides evidence to support the criticisms of Munasinghe (1999), showing that 




high per-capita income levels without high emission during the years of transition.  Chaudhuri and Pfaff 
(2002) address Rothman’s (1998) criticisms by using microeconomic data to test for the existence of an 
EKC at the household level.  Using household data from Pakistan, they show that individuals at higher 
income levels choose a cleaner immediate environment.  They then utilize a voting model to show how 
individual preferences for cleaner personal environme tal conditions might be aggregated to a national 
policy level, leading to greater environmental quality for a nation as a whole. 
Many empirical studies have begun to focus in on particular aspects of EKC theory, no doubt in at 
least partial response to the criticisms of Stern (1998, 2004) and others.  For example, Mazzanti and Zoboli 
(2007) use NAMEA19 panel data to investigate whether labor productivity and environmental efficiency are 
related.  They provide evidence that improvements in labor productivity are complementary to decreases in 
emissions per unit of output.  Johansson and Kristrom (2007) examine Swedish sulfur emissions over the 
span of the twentieth century, and determine that while the data roughly approximate the inverted-U shape 
of an EKC, that shape can be explained by the transi io  through four separate environmental policy 
regimes within Sweden.20 
Other studies have begun to investigate other variables that might play a role in the emergence of 
an EKC.  Di Viti (2007) addresses whether the various forms of common law systems or civil law systems 
have any advantage in achieving improvements in enviro mental quality with increases in income.  They 
find that emissions tend to be higher in common law systems, but so are foreign direct investment, gross 
domestic product growth, gross domestic savings, and market capitalization, and that abundance of capital 
explains all of these.  They find that the resulting low interest rates allow for implementation of 
environmentally friendly devices and further environmental protection.  Merlevede et al. (2006) and Cole et 
al. (2005) both find that countries with larger average firm size are more successful in improving the 
environment.21   
                                                
 19 Dutch National Accounting Matrix including Environmental Accounts.  
 20 These regimes encompass the following time periods: 1900-1918; 1919-1933; 1934-1967; and 1968-2002. 
 21 Cole et al. (2005) find that large firms produce lower emissions per employee and per unit of output.  
Merlevede et al. (2006) find that contries with larger firms pollute more early on, but that the presence of larger firms 
makes it easier for countries to pass strict enviromental regulations, leading to large firm countries engaging in 




Markandya et al. (2006) focus on different environme tal policy choices in various European 
countries, and find that policy decisions can shift the EKC to the right or left, or lower it uniformly.  
Auborg et al. (2008) find that countries that restructure their debt service obligations or implement 
democratic reforms see a shift in the turning point for an EKC.  Specifically, countries with lower foreign 
debt obligations and greater freedom experience a flatter EKC.  Park et al. (2007) include societal cultural 
characteristics, such as education, risk aversion, c centration of power, and materialism.  They make two 
findings: first, that higher emphasis on education increases environmental quality, and greater materialism 
and concentration of power decrease environmental quality; and second, that when these cultural variables 
are considered, evidence of an EKC diminishes or disappears.   
Richmond and Kaufmann (2006) investigate whether an EKC might arise out of a response to 
energy prices rather than income.  The fluctuation of relative energy prices (i.e., the price of oil as
compared to the price of coal), they argue, is more influential on the level of pollutants emitted than is the 
level of income.  They conclude that rising incomes are almost assuredly insufficient to cause a decrease in 
environmental degradation, and that a more realistic focus for societies wanting to improve their 
environment would be to focus on raising energy prices.  Lantz and Feng (2006) provide evidence that 
gross domestic product, a common measure of income in EKC analyses, is unrelated to carbon dioxide 
emissions, but that either population or technological22 changes are more likely culprits for explaining the
emergence of an inverted-U shape in carbon dioxide emissions.  
 These empirical studies have been somewhat successful in responding to critiques of EKC theory, 
and have begun to address the mechanics by which an EKC might develop.  However, these empirical 
efforts still appear subject to the criticisms of Stern (1998), in that they are less helpful in understanding the 
dynamic processes involved in the development of an EKC. 
 
2.5.  Static theoretical models, pro and con 
 In addition to the empirical analyses mentioned above, many economists have constructed static 
theoretical models that address Stern’s (1998) criticisms, including De Bruyn et al. (1998), Gawande et al. 
                                                
 22 The measure of technological change is a quadratic time index, and the authors admit that a more precise 




(2001), Antweiler et al. (2001), and Pfaff et al. (2001).  Rather than specify dependent and independent 
variables for a regression analysis in an ad hoc manner, these models develop a theoretical “snapshot” of a 
society in two different time periods, allowing the r searcher to see whether increasing incomes in the 
second period increases or decreases pollution in the second period. 
Some static models indicate that a focus on rising incomes as the cause of environmental 
improvements may be misplaced.  For example, De Bruyn et al. (1998) utilize decomposition analysis to 
argue that an inverted-U relationship resulted from changes in environmental policy and international 
environmental agreements, not by structural changes in the economy.  Gawande et al. (2001) also argue 
against easy answers for reductions in environmental degradation, showing that an EKC can appear over 
time as wealthy individuals move away from areas where pollution is higher.  Such movement, if not 
accounted for, could lead a cross-sectional study to de ermine that rising incomes cause declining polluti n 
when it may be lower pollution levels causing incomes to rise in a given area. 
Other static models provide support for a link between income and a clean environment.  
Antweiler et al. (2001) use a supply and demand analysis to look at the effect of free trade on the 
environment.  Dividing the effects of trade into scale, technique, and composition, they find that the 
increase in pollution from increased production (scale) is more than offset by the shift away from polluting 
industries (composition) and the improvement in technology (technique), leading to overall improvements 
in the environment due to free trade.  Pfaff et al. (2001) also support the ability of an EKC to develop, 
deriving a static model where households are allowed to “buy” environmental quality through changing 
household production methods; under reasonable conditions, a household-level EKC develops. 
 These theoretical static models add important insight into what might cause an EKC to develop, 
especially when paired with the empirical research mentioned above.  However, they are limited in their 
ability to describe the inherently dynamic nature of the decisions that societies make over time.  Rising 
incomes have the potential to affect a number of potentially relevant variables, such as the rate of capital 
accumulation, which would tend to directly impact pollution levels, but also society’s marginal valuation of 
a clean environment and/or capital, and consumption of various goods, including “green goods,” which 




less capable of accounting for the temporally interconnected nature of the economic and environmental 
variables inherent in EKC theory.  However, they still can be useful in understanding certain characteristics 
of the EKC.  For example, Plassmann and Khanna (2006b) utilize a simple static model to investigate th
impact of technology and preferences on the equilibrium income-pollution path. 
 
2.6.  Dynamic models 
 Empirical and static theoretical models will certainly continue to shed light on various aspects of 
EKC theory.  The process by which an EKC might develop is inherently dynamic, however, which lends 
support to the belief that dynamic models hold the greatest potential for gaining insight into the origins of 
an EKC. 
 Selden and Song (1995) offer the first dynamic analysis of EKC theory, showing that the optimal 
path for society may follow an inverted-U.  This path becomes more likely as technology advances and less 
likely as pollution overwhelms the carrying capacity of the environment, as proposed in Arrow et al. 
(1995).  Selden and Song (1995) also issue a caution that nothing guarantees a country will take the optimal 
path, so focusing solely on the optimal path may tell us little about the actual experiences of indiviual 
countries as they transition to higher income levels. 
Stokey (1998) develops both static and dynamic models, and indicates that an EKC is much more 
likely with endogenous technological change.  Stokey’s (1998) analysis focuses solely on production 
changes, excluding any discussion of individuals modifying their consumption choices.  While Rothman 
(1998) criticized the tendency to ignore either consumption or production, rather than recognizing the 
importance of both effects, Stokey advances the literature by introducing the concept of endogenous 
technical change, something missing from most EKC analyses.23  Cassou and Hamilton (2004) confirm 
Stokey’s arguments, arguing that endogenous economic growth may help the emergence of an EKC in 
situations where an EKC would otherwise not arise. 
                                                
 23 Managi (2006) argues that, at least in empirical studies, inclusion of a technology variable is necessary.  
Contrast that, however, with Johansson and Kristrom (2007), who admit that they do not incorporate endogenous 
technical change but argue, and we agree, that models do not need to incorporate endogenous technical change in order 




Anderson and Cavendish (2001) focus on policy decision making and technical change.  They 
stress that the traditional EKC model underestimates the ability of countries to obtain a cleaner 
environment as incomes rise by ignoring the roles of policy and technical progress.  Kelly (2003) utilizes 
an optimal control framework to evaluate how social pl nners maximize utility that is subject to a pollution 
byproduct.  He concludes that an EKC is more likely under two conditions: first, when pollutants assimilate 
slowly into nature, resulting in a faster build-up of pollution; and second, when the consumption share of 
utility decreases, indicating a greater role for a clean environment in determining the level of utility enjoyed 
by individuals and society.  Both of these conditions together result in higher marginal benefits of 
abatement and increase the likelihood of an EKC. 
 Ansuategi and Perrings (2000) address the interaction between nations where the environment is 
concerned.  They show that a country will choose a higher level of emissions when it does not have to bear 
the burden of its pollution, due to the transboundary properties of some pollutants.  The primary drawb ck 
of their analysis is that it does not account for the possibility of trade.  To assume that countries can affect 
each other negatively without admitting the potential benefits of trade on both countries leaves the analysis 
incomplete and less helpful.  On the other hand, Janssen and van den Bergh (2004) use optimal control to 
measure the effect of trade on the use of extracted resources, and they find evidence for the potential 
existence of an EKC. However, they utilize a single social planner for both countries, maximizing the sum 
of the two social utility functions.  This structure appears inconsistent with the nature of nations; in reality, 
each nation will independently seek to maximize their own utility. 
 Egli and Steger (2007) develop a simple model wherein individual households make the 
abatement choice.  They justify this assumption by pointing out that in certain industries, households bear 
the direct cost of abatement by having catalytic converters or other technologies that reduce tailpipe 
emissions.  Their model considers that households account for only part of the cost of pollution, so tha  
there will be at least a small negative externality.  They then aggregate to the national level, and discuss the 
public policy implications, such as the optimal taxin such a situation.  Similar to this research, they address 
the impact on turning points when society’s desire for a clean environment is greater than the desire for 




important contribution is similar to this research, although it is much more limited in scope, and does not 
address the full impact of parameter change, as we do here.  
 Dinda (2005) creates a simple, single-good model with endogenous growth.  Within the model, an 
EKC emerges along the non-optimal path.  It is the result of insufficient allocation of capital to abatement.  
At low incomes, society is unable to allocate capital to abatement.  This situation is non-optimal, but it is 
only at higher incomes that society is willing to increase investment to a level that more closely 
approximates the optimal path. 
 Each of these dynamic models has advanced the EKC debate by providing clearer understanding 
of what makes an EKC possible.  In order to reach a onclusion regarding the EKC phenomenon, however, 
there is a great deal yet to be investigated.  In particular, there are many assumptions made regarding the 
effect of certain parameters on variables in the model, and it may be incorrect to assume that the 
assumptions are universally correct.  Criado (2008) and Aubourg et al. (2008) provide evidence that 
variations between regions and countries will impact the results of an EKC analysis, which should urge 
greater caution in applying assumptions.  Moreover, each model herein includes only a few of the many 
variables that are likely involved in the development of empirical results predicted by EKC theory, which 
indicates that future research will likely investigate further those variables that are necessary for a thorough 
analysis. 
 
2.7.  Dynamic investigation of consumption and trade 
 This research represents an evolutionary step in the EKC literature by further advancing the 
sophistication of dynamic analysis.  The work of Kelly (2003) is used as a base from which to begin a more 
extensive investigation into the mechanics of a society’s productive and consumptive choices through time, 
choices which might determine whether an EKC will develop. 
 Kelly (2003) offers an initial answer to a lingering question in the EKC literature: why do some 
pollutants appear to exhibit an EKC while others do not?  According to Kelly, one possible explanation is 
that some pollutants are quickly assimilated into nature, while others remain in the air, water, or ground in 
hazardous form for a greater period of time, making their effects longer-lasting.  Kelly develops an optimal 




nature in the current time period.  Because current pollution causes a decrease in utility in both present and 
future time periods, slower assimilation increases the marginal benefit of additional pollution control.  
Therefore, a forward-thinking society will maximize the present value of a stream of utility arising i all 
future time periods, giving pollution abatement today additional value, and making it more likely that a 
society will engage in pollution control today.   
Kelly utilizes a constant-population model, indicatng that income levels rise as the economy 
grows; with increased production, pollution rises in the absence of abatement efforts.  By assuming a cost 
function that is convex in abatement, the marginal costs of cleaning up the pollution are increasing.  This 
would tend to result in lower abatement, but there ar  other pressures that might provide enough of a 
counter-balance to result in increasing abatement.  For example, an accumulation of pollution stocks may 
begin to decrease utility to the point where the marginal benefits of cleaning up pollution outweigh the 
marginal costs, leading society to engage in more cstly abatement.  At any income level, if the marginal 
benefits to pollution control are greater than the marginal costs, then the income-pollution relationship has 
a negative slope; it has a positive slope at income lev ls where the marginal costs of pollution contrl are 
greater than the marginal benefits.  By varying different pollution parameters, Kelly shows that the only 
assumptions needed to generate an EKC are: (1) a cost function convex in abatement; and (2) that 
environmental quality is a normal good. 
 Kelly utilizes a discrete time model that combines the above-mentioned cost function, which is 
convex in abatement effort, with Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions.  He assumes a stochasti  
process, operating under substantial uncertainty regarding the results of abatement choices; he chooses 
initial values for the variables; and he generates “emissions curves” for a hypothetical country, simulating 
the path of income and emissions levels in the country over time.  The path of emissions as capital stock24 
rises is the primary concern of the model, and Kelly presents his results as “emissions curves” and 
“pollution curves.”  These curves show the level of emissions and pollution at every level of capital stock, 
and indicate a quadratic relationship for some setsof parameter values, but also strictly decreasing a d
strictly increasing emissions curves for other setsof parameter values. 
                                                




To a greater or lesser extent, much of the recent EKC literature has begun to address Stern’s 
(1998) critique that too many unanswered questions remain about the mechanics of an EKC.  Stern (2004) 
renewed his criticism of EKC research, in general, st ting that there is only flimsy statistical support f r the 
existence of an EKC, and that a new generation of models will likely disprove the classical EKC theory and 
allow for greater emphasis on finding ways to improve the environment at lower levels of income.25  It is 
too early to tell whether the predicted demise of classical EKC theory will become a reality, and there a e 
certain areas that need illumination before Stern’s (2004) “new EKC” wish can be realized.  This research 
delves into one of those areas, specifically whether t  assumptions used by many researchers regardin the 
impact of parameter change are universally applicable.  Criado’s (2008) observation that inter-regional and 
international variations can alter the results of an EKC analysis can also be said for other relevant 
variations, such as variations between industries and between pollutants themselves.  By using two models 
of increasing complexity, we can explore the question of just how much confidence we can and should 
have in the assumptions we make related to the parameters of our models. 
                                                
 25 Constantini and Martini (2006) create a model for what they call a “Modified Environmental Kuznets 
Curve.”  In it, they use measures of sustainable dev lopment, rather than variables representing economic growth alone, 
as their regressors.  This is likely not the type of change Stern believes is necessary, but it does appear that researchers 






A CONTINUOUS TIME, DISCOUNTED UTILITY MODEL 
 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
 
The conflict between proponents and opponents of EKC theory arises in large part from a dispute 
over the underlying assumptions used in both theoretical and empirical research.  While the wide variety of 
assumptions cannot be simultaneously correct, that does not mean that seemingly contradictory 
assumptions cannot be valid along different ranges of parameter and variable values.  Assume for a 
moment the possibility that proponents and opponents of EKC theory are all accurate, and that seeming 
differences are explained by the particular starting values of certain parameters and system variables.  If 
that were the case, then a constructive dialogue might arise to determine society’s options for moving to a 
higher level of income while protecting the environment.  This chapter uses a simple model to evaluate 
whether a single set of assumptions need hold across all possible values of system parameters and 
variables. 
We utilize Kelly’s (2003) single-good optimal control model as a testing ground for some 
common assumptions regarding parameter change.  In order to test one set of assumptions, we maintain 
other common assumptions which are not the subject of this research.  We utilize the social planner 
construct, in which the social planner maximizes social utility by balancing choices of consumption, 
investment, and pollution abatement (which improves environmental quality).  Specifically, the social 
planner balances current consumption with future consumption while simultaneously balancing 
consumption with a clean environment.  The social pl nner construct is typically used for the sake of 
simplicity, but it is subject to certain criticisms. First, it may not be accurately descriptive of the way 
choices are made in a society where individual decision making, rather than central planning, governs many 
societal outcomes.  Second, the social planner construct does not allow for the existence of negative 
externalities, or it guarantees that any such externalities are internalized completely.  We utilize th  social 
planner construct, even with these potential criticisms, because we aim to investigate the universality of a 
narrow category of assumptions utilized in EKC models.  The social planner assumption is not one of the 




we wish to investigate. 
It is for the same reason that we choose not to use two components of Kelly’s (2003) model--the 
stochastic effect of pollution on the environment ad the desire of society to avoid abatement in order to 
better understand the process by which environmental degradation occurs.  Kelly and Kolstad (2003) 
developed these components in order to allow them to be ter model the uncertain effects of carbon dioxi e 
on climate change and to represent the desire of some t  postpone addressing the impact of carbon dioxide 
until the process is better understood.  While it is possible, or even likely, that these same characteristics are 
shared by all environmental problems, the impact of uncertainty on the process is not the focus of this
research.  We wish to focus very closely on a specific question, and we wish to avoid the possibility that 
that question will be confused by interesting, but unhelpful for our purposes, results arising solely out of the 
stochastic nature of Kelly’s (2003) model. 
 
3.2.  The model26 
Our model represents a primitive society, with a very low level of capital, kt, and a pristine 
environment, m .  As society grows economically, capital increases but at the expense of the environment.  
The use of capital to produce output also results in pollution, mt, which detracts from environmental 
quality.  The measure of environmental quality at any time can be ascertained by looking at the difference 
between m and the level of pollution, ( )tmm− , so that as pollution approaches m , environmental quality 
approaches zero.  It is also possible to see m  as the carrying capacity of the environment, as described by 
Arrow et al. (1995), such that if pollution exceeds m , the environment has lost some or all of its capacity to 
repair the harm caused by pollution, and will be forever unable to recover to its previous state.   
As an example, consider the Chesapeake Bay watershed in Maryland, Virginia, Delaware, 
Pennsylvania, the District of Columbia, and New York.  In recent years, increasing pollution runoff from 
farms, municipalities, or water treatment plants have led to increasing levels of nitrogen and phosphorous, 
which in turn have led to a decline in native species.  Invasive, non-native species that thrive in high 
nutrient waters have begun to replace native species, and it is thought that, if a way to reverse the trend is 
                                                
 26 The model presented in this section will follow, as closely as possible, the model presented in Kelly 




not found quickly, the Chesapeake will be pushed beyond the capacity to maintain its native species.  In 
other words, if pollution levels rise too high, native species will be completely replaced by invasive sp cies, 
and the previous ecosystem will be gone for good.  The permanent loss of native species, and especially the 
blue crab, which many Marylanders consider a part of the state’s identity, would be a terrible blow to 
residents of the states in the watershed. 
The potential for society to suffer because of environmental harm is also represented in the model, 
where society gains utility, U, from two sources: consumption, ct and environmental improvements, (-mt).  
Society experiences diminishing marginal utility in both consumption and environmental improvements.  
Note that environmental quality is represented by the negative of pollution, representing that a decrease in 
the level of pollution is what gives society an increase in their utility.  The amount of pollution emitted per 
unit of output, σ, is fixed.  We call σ the pollution intensity parameter, but it can also be thought of as the 
environmental component of production technology.  A value of zero for σ would indicate a completely 
clean method of production, without environmentally harmful byproducts of any kind, and a value of one 
would represent technology where every unit of output hat could be consumed would be accompanied by 
an identical amount of pollution.  There is a second technology component, A, which represents the 
efficiency of capital.  A higher value of A represents a higher level of output per unit of capital.  This model 
is a fixed technology model, so A, like σ, is fixed.  Mazzanti and Zoboli (2007) discuss technological 
innovation in a similar way, as divided between innovations in productive efficiency, A, and innovations in 
environmental efficiency, σ. 
Since the social planner cannot change the environmental component of production technology, 
and since society values a clean environment, the social planner must find some other way to raise utility 
through environmental improvements.  She can engage in efforts to mitigate, or abate, the harmful side 
effects of production.  This abatement process occurs simultaneous with production, so that the social 
planner chooses the percentage of pollution, ut to abate, and the total output is reduced by some a ount, 
G(u).  A value of u = 0 indicates that the social planner has chosen to engage in no abatement measures, so 
that production output will be maximized, but pollution will occur at whatever level is indicated by σ, the 




pollution arising from production--the cost will be higher, but there will be no harm caused to the 
environment.  
Production itself occurs in a process, F(k), where capital is the only input, and where capital 
experiences diminishing marginal returns.  Once the cost of abatement (in terms of output foregone) has 
been factored in and the social planner has allocated the optimal amount of net production, F(k)(1-G(u)), to 
consumption, the remaining production output is converted into capital at a 1:1 ratio.  That amount of 
capital is added to the existing capital stock, increasing the amount of capital available for production in the 
next time period.  That increase in capital is offset, omewhat, by the fact that capital depreciates t a fixed 
rate, δ1.  A depreciation rate of zero indicates that capital is permanent, and a depreciation rate of one 
indicates that society must replace the entire capital stock each time period.  Likewise, whatever pollution 
survives the abatement process, σF(k)(1-G(u)), will add to the pollution stock.  The stock of pollution 
decreases at the rate at which pollution is capable of being assimilated into the environment, δ2.  An 
example of pollution assimilating into the environment can be seen in the limited capacity of all plants to 
remove carbon dioxide from the air during their respiration process.  An assimilation rate of one means that 
there is no carryover pollution to the next time period; in other words, a pure flow pollutant.  An 
assimilation rate of zero means that society is foreve  stuck with the pollution we allow into the 
environment, similar to the current situation with spent nuclear rods that have a half-life of thousand  of 
years. 
So, in mathematical terms, the social planner maximizes utility, ( )tttt mcUU −= , , where utility is 


































U , ( ) ∞=−mU c ,0 , ( ) 0, =−∞ mU c , 
( ) ∞=− 0,cU m , ( ) 0, =∞− cU m .  The assumption of concavity in utility allows for constant marginal utility 
over some interval, but disallows increasing marginal utility of consumption.  Society receiving utility from 




















U .   
Society produces output at the level, ( )tkF , where ( )tkF  is continuous, twice differentiable, and 














kF , ( ) ∞=0kF , ( ) 0=∞kF .  
Pollution emissions are produced at ( )tkFσ , and are abated as the social planner foregoes output in return 
for lower emissions.  The social planner chooses what fraction of emissions to eliminate, [ ]1,0∈tu , and the 

















uG .  ( )tuG  is therefore a unit cost function, representing the portion of each unit of output that is 
forgone in order to achieve ut, the desired level of pollution abatement, ( ) [ ]1,0∈tuG .28  Net emissions, then, 
are defined by the portion of total emissions, ( )tF kσ , not abated through the choice of ut: 
( ) ( )ttt kFue σ−= 1 .  The total foregone output as a result of abatement is defined by ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]ttt kFkFuG ,0∈ .  
Total output is reduced by the total cost of abatement, yielding net output, ( ) ( )( )tt uGkF −1 .  Net output can 
then be consumed today or invested for future consumption.  Investment is denoted by zt in society’s 
resource constraint, ( ) ( ) ( ) 0=−++ ttttt kFkFuGzc .  Therefore, according to the resource constraint, society 
utilizes output in three ways: consumption (ct); investment (zt); or pollution abatement ( ) ( )tt kFuG .  
Investment and depreciation of capital, [ ]1,01 ∈δ , define the law of motion for capital: 
( ) ( )( ) tttttt kcuGkFkzdt
dk
11 1 δδ −−−=−= .  Higher levels of capital in future time periods allow for 
higher total output and, therefore, higher levels of consumption. 
                                                
 27 Of course, those large decreases in utility from environmental degradation must be outweighed by the 
initial increases in consumption that can only occur from production. 
 28 The restriction of the cost function to this range requires that cost be nonnegative, and that the process of 




As a result, it is possible for a society with rising capital stocks to enjoy higher levels of 
consumption even while increasing abatement and improving the environment.  The stock of a clean 
environment is measured by reference to the amount of pollution remaining from the last time period (mt), 
plus the net emissions from the current time period production.  The stock of pollution depreciates as it i  
assimilated into nature, which it does at the rate [ ]1,02 ∈δ .  Emissions can thus be thought of as investment 
in the future stock of pollution, with the assimilation rate depreciating that stock, so that the polluti n stock 
in any time period is simply the cumulative effect of emissions from all past time periods, minus the 
amount of accumulated pollution which the environmet has been able to assimilate since the last time 
period.  Emissions in the present time period and the assimilation rate define the law of motion for the 
stock of a clean environment: ( ) ( ) ( ) ttttt mkFumedt
md
22 1 δσδ +−−=+−=
− . 
 The social planner is considered to be forward-looking, making decisions based on an infinite time 
horizon.  Thus, the social planner faces the following problem: 
 Max ( )∫ −= −
t
tt
t dtmcUeW ,ρ  
 s.t. 
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In other words, the social planner maximizes utility subject to a budget constraint and the laws of motion 
for capital investment and pollution.  This is a present-value specification, which means that future utility is 
discounted to the present, according to the positive rate of time preference, or discount factor, ρ.  The social 
planner, with this specification, chooses the stream of decisions for all variables at time zero.  The control 
variables are tc  and tu , and the state variables are tk and tm− .   
 Missing from the problem is an express transversality condition.  Some believe that, for general 
infinite time problems, a transversality condition is not necessary.29  Even if not required, however, a 
                                                
 29 For a justification of this assumption, please seeF rguson and Lim (1998) and Seierstad and Sydsaeter 




transversality condition is useful in that it assures that the system does not grow without bound.  That is the 
conventional transversality condition, and while our system does not contain an express transversality 
condition, the conventional transversality condition s satisfied by the assumptions of the model.30 
The Present Value Hamiltonian is: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]tttttttttttt mkFukcuGkFmcUeH 21 11, δσξδψρ −−−−−−+−= − , 
where tψ  is the present-value co-state variable for capital and tξ  is the present-value co-state variable for a 
clean environment.  Co-state variables represent th respective societal values of a marginal unit of the state 
variables.  It is assumed that societies will always place a positive value on an additional unit of output and 
a clean environment, leading to positive values for 
tψ  and tξ . 
 Deriving first-order conditions for this problem leads to optimal solutions for the control variables, 
along with the laws of motion for the co-state variables.  We assume all decisions by the social planner are 
made in current time, or in other words, that the decision for each time period t is made at the beginning of 






U     (3.1) 
 






kF ϕσλ    (3.2) 
 
________________________ 
infinite time horizon problems.  For finite time horizons, either the state variable must have a fixed value at the terminal 
time, or if the state variable is free, the co-state variable must equal zero in the terminal time period.  Seierstad and 
Sydsaeter (pp. 233-34) state that the “natural” transversality conditions are not necessary conditions f r the general 
case. 
 30 Recall that the production function is strictly con ave and satisfies the Inada conditions.  At some point, 
there is no additional societal benefit to be gained from increasing the capital stock.  If production has an upper limit, 
so, too, does consumption of that production.  Abatement is expressed as a percentage of each unit of production 
foregone to improve the environment, so an upper limit on production guarantees an upper limit on abatement, as well.  
If consumption experiences an upper limit, a utility maximizing social planner cannot allow pollution to increase 
without bound, for each additional unit of pollution would diminish utility.  Thus, pollution must have an upper limit, 
as well.  Finally, if capital and pollution have upper limits, then the costate variables for capital and pollution, described 
herein, must have limits as well. 
 31 In order to reduce clutter, we have removed time subscripts.  First-order conditions define the optimal time 
paths for the control, state, and co-state variables; however, as a caution, we refer the reader to the previous discussion 
of Selden and Song’s (1995) assertion that many societies may not be progressing along their optimal path.  Therefore, 
the following analysis would not be representative of a country’s development in the presence of significant 
impediments to optimal decision making; for example, in the presence of monopolistic interest groups that control 
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 Eqs. (3.1) and (3.2) are the partial derivatives of the Hamiltonian with respect to the control 
variables, consumption, and abatement, respectively.  Eqs. (3.5) and (3.6) are the laws of motion, 
previously defined, for the state variables, capital, and a clean environment.  Arriving at the current-value 
first-order conditions requires multiplying through each present value equation by teρ .  The exceptions to 
that rule are Eqs. (3.3) and (3.4), the laws of motion for the costate variables.  We define the current-value 
co-state variables as ψλ ρte=  and ξϕ ρte= .  Taking the derivative of these definitions with respect to time, 
we arrive at Eqs. (3.3) and (3.4).  
 Eq. (3.1) indicates that the level of consumption chosen will be such that the marginal value of 
present consumption is equated with the marginal value of capital, which represents future consumption.  
Note that (3.1) implies that λ > 0 along the optimal path.  Meanwhile, Eq. (3.2) indicates the level of 
pollution abatement that will be chosen along the optimal time path.  All of the equations represent a 
number of tradeoffs that must be considered in choosing the optimal level of each variable.  The first part 






− λ , is the lost value to society when an additional unit of income is spent on pollution 
abatement, rather than consumption or investment; the second part, ( )kFϕσ , is the gain to society due to 
abatement.  Note also that (3.2) and (3.1) imply thatφ > 0, which assumes that society will place a positive 
value on a clean environment along the optimal time path. 
The remaining first-order conditions are the laws of m tion for the state and co-state variables.  Of 
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F , represents the value of the net marginal product of 










u σϕ 1 , represents the value of the harm caused by the marginal product of capital, as it increases 
pollution.  Investment in future capital means greater potential consumption, but also greater potential 
pollution, and (3.3) illustrates the cost and benefit of each additional unit of capital accumulated.  As one of 
her many tasks, the social planner must balance the gain in potential consumption that comes from 
investment with the potential loss in societal well-being that would result as the additional capital is put to 
use in making the goods society wishes to consume.   
Eq. (3.4) describes the change in the marginal value of a clean environment over time.  If pollution 













U .  The assimilation rate, δ2, impacts the level of pollution, removing a portion f the 
pollution stock, and therefore also impacts the value of φ.  As society progresses along the optimal time 
path, production will increase, and depending upon the level of abatement chosen, so will the level of 
pollution.  Recall that, as stated earlier in the capter, when δ2 = 1, the pollution is a pure flow pollutant, 
and will not accumulate any stock of the pollutant cross time.  That means that the level of environmental 
quality will be degraded only to the extent of current pollution, and without any build-up of pollution, 
society would not experience the type of environmental degradation that would cause a significant increase 
in society’s valuation of the environment.  In other words, ceteris paribus, an increase in the assimilation 
rate would yield a lower level of pollution in every time period and, therefore, a lower value of φ along the 
optimal time path.   
Of course, because this is a system of equations that are solved simultaneously, and therefore all 
else is not held constant, the impact of an increase in the assimilation rate may not be that simple to predict.  
Eq. (3.4) seems to indicate that, as the pollution stock is assimilated into nature, the marginal value of a 
clean environment appears to increase as well.  This result is very counter-intuitive, because it proposes 




clean environment.  Kelly (2003) argues that as the assimilation rate rises, the marginal benefit of 
abatement falls,32 which could lead to higher pollution along the optimal path.  Over some range of values, 
that is almost assuredly correct.  However, it is also possible that a decrease in abatement could yie
higher pollution levels and, therefore, a higher marginal value of a clean environment.  In short, it is 
unclear at this point what the likely result of a change in the assimilation rate will be.  Thus, Kelly’s (2003) 
assumption is inherently sound, but not universal, as will be further illustrated in more depth in subequent 
parts of this research. 
Eq. (3.5) describes the change in capital stock over time.  The social planner knows that whatever 
output is left over after the levels of abatement and consumption have been chosen for the current time
period will be invested in capital for future time periods, and this investment decision occurs 
simultaneously with the consumption and abatement dcisions.  Additionally, every time period sees some 
depreciation in the then-existing capital stock.  Eq. (3.6) describes the change in the stock of a clen 
environment over time.  Emissions in the current time period increases the stock of pollution, and 
assimilation of some portion of the accumulated stock f pollution, emitted in all past time periods, 
improves the environment. 
For numerical analysis, specific functional forms for utility, production, and pollution abatement 
cost functions are defined.  Kelly (2003) utilizes the following functional forms: 











mcU    (3.7) 
( ) γAkkF =      (3.8) 
( ) 210 bubbuG +=     (3.9) 
Utility and production are Cobb-Douglas functions; the utility function, known as the constant relative risk-
aversion utility function, preserves the assumed negative marginal utility of pollution as well as the positive 
marginal utility for consumption, and it is used to maintain a constant level of risk aversion among 
members of society across consumption levels.  As income in society grows, its general preference 
structure remains the same, so its willingness to engage in the trade-off between present and future income, 
                                                




and between consumption and a clean environment remains the same.33 The parameter η measures both 
relative risk aversion and the willingness to substitute consumption across time periods.  Further, 1≤η  
assures decreasing marginal utility to both consumption and a clean environment, and 1<η assures that 
consumption and environmental quality are complementary goods.  The parameter α represents the return 
in utility to the individual from consumption, and m is the assimilative capacity of the environment.  As 
discussed previously, that means that if pollution ever equalsm , there will be no environmental quality left 
for society to enjoy, and if pollution is ever great r than m , the environment will be permanently 
damaged, so that all the clean-up in the world could not return the environment to its pristine state. 
The production function, F(k), assumes diminishing returns to scale in capital (i.e., ( )1,0∈γ .  The 
parameter A represents the level of technology that concerns the efficiency of capital,34 as opposed to the 
environmental efficiency of capital, σ.  Meanwhile, the pollution abatement cost function utilizes the 
following parameters: b0, the fixed cost of pollution abatement; b1, the variable cost of abatement; and b2, 
the measure of convexity for the abatement cost functio .  Fixed costs and variable costs are fairly easily 
understood, but the meaning of the convexity parameter bears a little more explanation.  The abatement 
cost function is convex as long as b2 > 1, and 2
bu  will converge to 1 as u approaches 1.  A higher value of 
b2 means that the abatement cost function is increasingly convex, which in turn means that abatement cost
is lower for all values of u less than 1, and that for low values of u marginal cost is lower, and for higher 
values of u marginal cost is higher.  As mentioned previously, abatement cost will always be the same 
when full abatement (u = 1) is chosen. 
 Applying the functional forms presented above, Eqs. (3.1) through (3.6) may be rewritten as: 
 ( ) ( )( )( ) λα ηαηα =− −−−− 1111 mmc   (3.1a) 
 ( ) ϕσλ =−121 2bubb     (3.2a) 
                                                
 33 It is certainly not impossible for a change in prefe nces to occur as incomes rise, but we leave that 
complicating factor for future researchers. 
 34 One admitted drawback to this specification of the production function is that it assumes a constant level of 
technology.  Future research possibilities include modifications to allow for learning-by-doing or other forms of 




 ( )( ) ( )[ ]11101 11 2 −− −++−−−= γγ σγϕδγρλλ AkuubbAkdt
d b  (3.3a) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ηηαηααδρϕϕ −−− −−−+= 112 1 mmcdt
d   (3.4a) 




21 δγ −−−−=   (3.5a) 





−    (3.6a) 
Note from (3.1a) that if pollution ever rises beyond the maximum amount that the environment can bear, 
the left-hand-side becomes negative, leading society to place a negative value on an additional unit of 
capital.  We place no specific constraint on this po sibility, however, because it could only occur in a on-
optimal scenario; it would be characterized by society paying to first create and then destroy productive 
capital.  Such a scenario is not applicable to this model, which envisions a society choosing an optimal path 
through time; if society has a level of capital that is detrimental to societal well being, then society has 
made a choice that did not maximize societal utility and is, by definition, on some non-optimal time path. 
 
3.3.  Solving the problem 
 Of course, the first-order equations, by themselves, t ll us very little about the process they 
describe; we learn a good deal more from the process once it has been solved for the stationary state.  The 
process of solving a dynamic problem, such as the one presented here, can take a number of paths, most of 
which require the reduction of the first-order equations to a system of differential equations composed 
exclusively of parameters and those variables for which there exist differential equations.  That system of 
equations need then be solved for the steady or stationary state; in the present case the next step is to utilize 
that stationary state and reasonable initial values to derive the optimal path of the system to its steady (or 
stationary) state.  This section describes the process utilized to solve the particular dynamic problem 
presented in this chapter. 
 
3.3.1.  The system of differential equations 
 
 We begin by reducing the first-order conditions to a system of differential equations comprised 














































ϕ .     (3.2c) 
These optimal choices can then be substituted into the remaining differential equations.  We lose nothing 
by doing so, because (3.1c) and (3.2c) define the optimal choice for consumption and abatement at any 
point in time, and that condition is maintained within the other equations. 
 Once the solutions for consumption and abatement are substituted into the remaining equations, 
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d   (3.4c) 











































−−−−−−  (3.5c) 




























− −    (3.6c) 
 
3.3.2.  An emissions curve 
 
 The process of finding the stationary state in a simple model can be handled with relative ease; the 
process involves setting each equation equal to zer, to represent the lack of movement at the stationry 
state, and then solving for the value of the variables in that state.  In most cases, a phase diagram is then 
used to characterize the optimal path and the comparative statics of the system.  The equations present d 




Simulations are often used to solve complex problems; Kelly (2003) utilizes simulations, as do 
Farzin (1996), Howarth (2000), and Huhtala (1997).  We, too, will utilize a simulation to derive the optimal 
path; in doing so, we utilize the algorithms provided by the mathematical program Matlab.  By solving for 
the stationary state, we can then derive the optimal path for all variables, and check the effect of various 
parameter changes on the emissions path.  EKC theory is often expressed in terms of the relationship 
between incomes and the environment.  We will use capital as the measure for income, paralleling Kelly 
(2003).  Capital is the means by which production of g ods takes place, and a standard macroeconomic 
identity exists between real income and the total amount of goods consumed and saved.  Meanwhile, 
emissions are defined in the model as follows: 





























11    (3.10) 
As the variables progress through time along their optimal time paths, equation (3.10) allows us to 
track the optimal level of emissions, as well, and by plotting levels of capital against emissions, we
generate an emissions curve.  The time paths also allow us to generate pollution curves by plotting capit l 
stock against pollution levels.  We do this because a ingular focus on emissions may ignore the long-term 
effects of pollution accumulation.  Arrow et al. (1995) explicitly criticized such a focus on emissions, 
stating that zero emissions mean less if the enviroment has been pushed beyond its ability to recover by 
high pollution levels at intermediate income levels.  In other words, and as discussed previously, if 
pollution has surpassed m , the fact that society has reduced current emission  cannot compensate for the 
permanent damage done to the environment.  In such a ase, the environment would have been harmed 
beyond its ability to be repaired, so even eliminating pollution entirely could not return society to its
original level of utility with respect to the environment.  Once optimal emissions and pollution curves have 
been derived, modification of various parameters will allow us to see their impact on the optimal emissions 
and pollution curves, and comparison of emissions curves will then allow us to test the validity of 





3.3.3.   The stationary state 
 
 Eqs. (3.3c) to (3.6c) cannot be easily solved withou  the use of an algorithm that can take small 
steps until arriving at the stationary state.  By utilizing the program Matlab we derive the stationary state.35  
This first step, solving for the stationary state, is feasible using the continuous equations already derived.  
The next step, deriving the optimal path for the system, requires that we discretize the continuous 
equations.  We do so by utilizing a process described y Lyon (2006), which begins with formulating our 
problem as a discrete rather than continuous problem.  We restate the Present Value Hamiltonian as a 
discrete-time Bellman equation, wherein the social pl nner maximizes Utility subject to the laws of motion 
for capital and environmental quality:36 
( ) ( ) ( )ttttttt mkVmcUmkV −+−=− + ,,, 1β  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )tttttttttttt mkFukcuGkFVmcUmkV 211 11,11,, δσδβ −−−−−+−−+−=− +  (3.11) 
The first-order equations are derived in similar fashion to the continuous equations derived above.  By 
taking the partial derivatives of (3.11) with respect to c and u, yields (3.14) and (3.15), respectively.  By the 
Envelope theorem: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( )
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=φ , which when substituted into (3.12) and (3.13) yields (3.17) and (3.18).  
Our final first-order conditions are the laws of motion fr capital (3.18) and for a clean environment (3.19). 
( ) ( )( )( ) 0c 1t
1-11-1
t =−− +
−− βλα ηαηα tmm    (3.14) 
( ) 0- 1t12211t =− +−+ σβϕβλ btubb    (3.15) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) 0111 - 11t10111tt 2 =−−−−+− −+−+ γγ σγβϕγδβλλ ttbtt AkuubbAk  (3.16) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 011  1121tt =−−+−−
−−−
+
ηηαηααδβϕϕ tt mmc   (3.17) 
                                                
 35 Code available from the author upon request. 




( ) ( ) 011 1101 2 =−−+−−−+ ttbttt kcubbAkk δγ   (3.18) 
( ) ( ) 011 21 =−−−−+ tttt mAkum δσ γ    (3.19) 
Matlab is able to derive the stationary state for the system yet not for all ranges of parameter values.  We 
choose the parameter values listed in Table 1, and the resulting stationary state, as the starting point for our 
analysis.  The initial parameter values need to satisfy two important criteria, one functional and one 
theoretical.  The functional criteria is that algorithmic programs like Matlab are limited in their capacity to 
solve complex systems, so the parameter values must be such that Matlab is capable of solving the system 
of equations for the stationary state.  The set of parameter values that will allow for a stationary state 
solution is not unlimited, but neither is that set extremely small.  However, meeting the functional criteria is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition; the theoretical criteria is needed to assure that the results are 
meaningful.37   
The theoretical criteria is that each parameter must be within a range that allows for a meaningful, 
if abstract, comparison to real life.  For example, γ needs to be somewhere between 0 and 1 because, as the 
parameter that reflects returns to capital, a value between 0 and 1 reflects diminishing returns to capital.  
The fixed and variable costs of abatement, b0 and b1, respectively, need to be positive and, in the case of b1, 
less than 1, in order to allow for the possibility that society is capable of abating 100 percent of emissions 
in any time period, should it choose to do so.  The onlyconstraint on b2 is that it be greater than 1, in order 
to assure that the cost function is convex.  We require that 0 < η < 1 in order to guarantee that there be 
complementarity between consumption and environmental quality, nd that 0 < α < 1 in order to guarantee 
that society receives positive utility from consumption, subject to diminishing marginal utility.  We also 
require that 0 < δ1 < 1 so that capital depreciates over time, but cannot be greater thn 1 or else future 
capital would disappear before it came into existence.  Likewise, e require that 0 < δ2 < 1 so that pollution 
assimilates at some positive rate, but so that pollution is neither a pure stock nor a pure flow pollutant.  We 
require that 0 < A < 1, to represent that capital is productive but not perfectly efficient, and that 0 < σ < 1, 
to represent that production results in pollution, but that the amount of pollution 
                                                
 37 A number of sets of parameter variables which fulfilled the functional criteria were discarded because they 
failed to fulfill the theoretical criteria.  For example, a number of parameter sets were unusable becaus  they would 







Parameter and variable values   
Parameter    Value 
 γ 0.45 
 b0  0.01 
 b1  0.08 
 b2  3.5 
 η 0.9 
 α 0.5 
 δ1 0.1 
 δ2 0.1 
 A  0.6 
 σ 0.45 
 ρ 0.05 
m   10 
Stationary state   
 c 0.602 
 u 0.8565 
 λ 0.9523 
 φ 0.4023 
 k 2.4455 
 m 0.5794 
 
is less than the amount of output.  The parameter ρ is the discount rate, so we require that 0 < ρ  0.10 in 
order to reflect what we believe is a reasonable discount rate.  Finally, we require only that m  > 0, so that 
the environment have some positive maximum carrying capacity.  A higher value of m  means that each 
unit of pollution has a relatively lower negative impact on the environment as a whole. 
These restrictions assure that the model will allow for a meaningful comparison to reality.  
However, this comparison will be only an abstract comparison, for the values are not chosen to correspond 
to any specific real-world circumstances.  The purpose of this research is to test whether, under reasonable 
conditions, the expected systemic reactions to parameter change will always hold.  We do not attempt to 
show whether those expected reactions hold when applied to any specific pollutant in any specific society.  
Thus, it is not of great concern that the returns to capital utilized here may not match with the average 
returns to capital achieved in, say, the U.S. steel industry or the Brazilian power industry.  Similarly, our 




the path to the stationary state is likely different for each soiety, including the number of years that it takes 
to arrive at the stationary state.  In other terms, the parameter and variable values, as well as the interval 
over which the simulation occurs, should be considered in relativ  rather than absolute terms. 
 
3.3.4.  The optimal time paths 
 
With stationary state values in hand, we can derive the optimal e path for the system.  By 
utilizing Matlab algorithms, once again we will input initial values for capital and pollution stocks, 
stationary state values for our costate variables, λ and φ, and allow the values of the control variables to be 
determined by the system.  Our choice of iterative methods for finding the best fit path from the initial time 
period to the stationary state is what Press et al. (1992) refer to as a “Relaxation Method.”  In brief, we use 
Matlab to construct an estimated time path, using initial state values and stationary state costate values, and 
then we use the relaxation method to find the best fit path.  T e relaxation method constructs a matrix 
where the (i,j) element is the derivative of equation i with respect to variable j;  Eq. i cycles through 
Eqs. (3.14) to (3.19), for every time period.38  The result is a matrix in block form, around the primary 
diagonal, which can be solved using Gaussian elimination to derive the incremental changes in variable 
values.  The process undergoes multiple iterations until the incremental changes  are sufficiently small and 
the estimated time path closely approximates the true time path. 
 We choose to simulate the optimal time path for a country from the beginning of development 
through the stationary state, so we choose an initial capital level of k0 = 0.05.  Before development begins, a 
country can be thought of as having no pollution, so we choose an initial pollution level of m0 = 0.  
Combined with the terminal values of λss = 0.9523 and  φss = 0.4023, we utilize the relaxation method to 
derive the optimal emissions and pollution curves illustrated in Figs. 1a and 1b, respectively.  The inverted-
U shape exhibited in Figs. 1a and 1b are the traditional shape of th EKC.  Thus, for the reasonable values 
chosen, an EKC is exhibited, though it is one without full abatement, so that society chooses a level of 
pollution less than the peak but greater than 0. 
                                                















 The time paths for the remaining variables are illustrated in Figs. 2a-2c.  Fig. 2a shows that 
consumption rises in initial time periods, reaching a value near the stationary state value of 0.602 within the 
first third of the time allotted for the simulation.  Fig. 2a also shows that abatement rises rapidly within the 
first third of the allotted time to a value near the stationary state of 0.8565.  The rapid rise in consumption is 
fueled by the rapid rise of capital, exhibited in Fig. 2b.  At t = 30, capital has reached a level above 2, 
where it remains throughout the rest of the simulation.  Higher levels of capital allow for higher levels of 
consumption, but it also explains the rapid rise in polluti n, seen in Fig. 2c.  Additionally, as capital rises, 
the value of λ falls, and as pollution rises, and therefore environmental quality falls, the value of φ rises.  So 
as society begins to progress from its initial state, it begins to accumulate capital and consume the output.  
As pollution rises, however, society also chooses to forego more and more potential output in order to 
combat the increasing pollution problem.  Emissions levels pak very early in the development path, before 
abatement efforts can catch up to the increases in pollution.  Pollution also peaks early in the society’s 
development path, although later than emissions, due to the fact that in order to eliminate pollution, society 
must combine abatement efforts with the passage of time, over which pollution assimilates. 
 
 


















3.3.5.  The effect of parameter change 
 
 We pose the following question: How will the optimal emissions and pollution paths change if the 
parameter values are allowed to change?  In our model, we assume only one type of pollution, only one 
technology for abating the flow of that pollution, only one technology for the production which yields that 
pollution, and so on.  However, as pointed out by Criado (2008), different countries and/or regions will 
experience different production and environmental technologies, and the intuitive assumptions that 
accurately describe circumstances in one country or region may not be descriptive of other countries or 
regions.39  Various pollutants may also experience different fixed and variable costs, leading to different 
emissions curves and pollution curves for different pollutants and countries.40  This may all seem like 
common sense, and certainly has been discussed in the literature, but the intuitive assumptions regarding 
which direction the emissions curves shift with a parameter change may not be universally correct.  Starting 
from the emissions and pollution curves derived and shown in Figs. 1a and 1b, we adjust certain parameter 
values,41 and compare the changes in the emissions and pollution curves to the results that would be 
predicted under some of the more commonly used assumptions. 
 We begin with the variable cost of abatement, b1.  It is not difficult to imagine the variable cost of 
abatement differing across pollutants and across countries.  There is no single abatement technology, and 
even within an industry, multiple types of abatement may be utilized.  Take coal-fired electricity, for 
example, where scrubbers are used as an end-of-pipe method of rem ving sulfur dioxide and other 
particulate pollution before exhaust is released into the air.  That method of abatement is used 
simultaneously with technology that allows for more efficient use of the energy within coal, so that there is 
less polluting byproduct, as a whole.  The two technologies have the same purpose, but they abate air 
pollution in different ways, and with different costs perton of pollutant removed from the air.  
 We would anticipate that when the variable cost of abatement increases, the amount of abatement 
                                                
 39 Plassmann and Khanna (2006b) show that while one technology cannot lead to an EKC for all pollutants, 
an EKC should be possible for every pollutant under th  right set of preferences and technology. 
 40 The way society views a particular pollutant may also be important.  Plassmann and Khanna (2006a) argue 
that “consumers are unlikely to react to changes in pollution that they consider harmless” (p. 25).  
 41 There are obviously more parameters than we test here.  Kelly (2003) tests the effect of certain parameters 
on the emissions and pollution curves, and for the sake of comparison to an accepted model, we modify those 




would decrease.  As abatement decreases, the amount of pollution would likely increase in two ways.  First, 
there should be an increase in pollution as the same amount of production resulted in a higher amount of 
emissions.  Second, less abatement would mean higher total output, which could be used for consumption 
or investment in future capital.  If invested in future capital, there would be even greater production in 
future time periods, and therefore greater pollution.  As shown in Fig. 3a, an increase in b1 yields the 
expected result, a shift upward in both emissions and pollution corresponding to every level of capital.  
Fig. 3a also shows that the stationary state level of capital is slightly less after b1 increased, indicating that, 
at least under the conditions of this simulation, society did not use additional available output as a result of 
lower abatement as a means of accumulating more capital in the long run.  One possible explanation is that 
society preferred to consume the additional output that was not used up in abatement. 
 Next we turn to b2, which we call the convexity cost parameter of abatement.  Of course, as 
mentioned previously, the abatement cost function is only convex in u if b2 is greater than 1.  As b2 rises, 
the cost curve becomes more convex; but since u is constrained to be between 0 and 1, greater convexity 









planner chooses some level of abatement near full abatement.  It may be helpful to think of a higher value 
of b2 corresponding to something closer to constant returns to scale in u. 
 As b2 increases, then an increase in abatement costs relatively less, so we sh uld expect to see an 
increase in abatement.  That increase in abatement should result in a lower level of emissions and pollution 
through time.  As we look at Fig. 3b, we see that our expectations are met only at low levels of capital.  
Unexpectedly, the emissions curve does not simply shift upwards or down, but rather changes shape 
entirely.  Lower initial levels of emissions and pollution are followed by higher stationary state levels of 
both, so that the curves cross as society approaches the stationary state.  This type of reaction is not 
predicted by any of the traditional assumptions that are made regarding abatement costs, but that is not to 
say that there is not an intuitive explanation.  For example, it is possible that, with an increase in the 
convexity of the cost function, society progresses towards the s ationary state, enjoying the cleaner 
environment that comes from increased abatement.  However, because mis ions and pollution have not 
risen as quickly, the value of a clean environment has also not risen.  As a result, society reaches its 










 Next, we turn to α, society’s return to utility from consumption.  As α increases, society receives 
increased utility from every unit of consumption.  Recall also that α is the share of utility received from 
consumption or, in other words, it is the r lative utility received from consumption, as compared to the 
utility received from environmental quality.  Thus, as α increases, the share of utility received from 
consumption increases and the share of utility received from environmental quality decreases.  This means 
that the shape of the societal indifference curves is changing, and if the shape is changing, the slope of the 
curve or the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) is changing as well.  If the budget constraint were 
constant, the reaction to a change in α would be much easier to predict, because the optimal choice of 
consumption will be where the MRS is equal to the marginal rate of echnical substitution (MRTS), which 
is the slope of the production constraint.  A quick review of Eqs. (3.14) to (3.19) makes clear that a change 
in α will impact all the equations and likely result in changes to the production constraint and therefore the 
MRTS.  If both the MRS and the MRTS are changing, we will likely experience income and substitution 
effects, making prediction much more difficult.  
 The simplest assumption regarding the impact of an increase in the relative utility received from 
consumption is that consumption would increase, which would require either a decrease in abatement 
efforts, so that total net output rises, or if abatement efforts remain constant, it would require a smaller 
investment in future capital, since society invests whatever output is not consumed.  Fig. 3c indicates that 
the social planner likely made the former choice, since the stationary state level of capital appears to be 
identical, but both emissions and pollution have increased through all time periods.  Of course, the fact that 
the common, intuitive assumption proved to be accurate in this situation does not mean that its accuracy is 
universal; as this chapter shows, it should only be with great care that we rely heavily on the universal 
application of even the most intuitive assumption.  
 Next, we turn to the impact of a shift in the assimilation rate, δ2, on the emission and pollution 
curves.  As discussed previously, the assimilation rate is the rate at which pollution will become assimilated 
into nature and, therefore, not a harm to the environment if no other action is taken.  As an example, carbon 
dioxide is considered by many to be a greenhouse gas, leading to a trend of increasing warming that could 







Fig. 3c.  Increase in utility from consumption of x (alpha) from 0.5 to 0.51. 
 
 
will slowly be assimilated into nature predominantly via the respiratory process of plants.  As plants utilize 
the carbon dioxide, it is removed from the air and, in terms elevant to this research, assimilates it.  The 
assimilation rate will likely vary across both countries andpollutants.  It will vary across countries for those 
pollutants whose effects are more localized.  For example, some c untries are highly urbanized, and that 
urbanization will tend to reduce the total vegetation available to assimilate certain pollutants.  Other 
countries, even industrialized countries, have maintained a significant amount of “green space,” which 
would tend to increase the assimilation rate for some pollutants.  Of course, there are some pollutants that 
are not easily assimilated into the environment, and for many of these the rate will be constant across 
countries.  An example would be the radioactive elements left ov r after the process of generating nuclear 
power; the half-life of many of those radioactive elements run  into the tens of thousands of years, and it 
likely matters very little where it is stored, so that the assimilation rate is likely to be very low regardless of 




 A higher assimilation rate could discourage abatement efforts, since emissions will more rapidly 
dissipate into the environment; if nature is going to take care of emissions for you, why bother giving up 
output to take care of it?  Alternatively, however, a higher assimilation rate could result in lower emissions 
if the cost of achieving a clean environment is lower due to the help that nature offers.  Fig. 3d indicates 
that, for our model, the former has occurred, as emissions and pollution are both higher for every level of 
capital.  The former may be the more likely outcome for any given set of parameter values, but the fact that 
the opposite outcome also has a very intuitive explanation should give us pause as to whether the 
assumption is accurate across the entire range of legitimate parameter values.   
 What the outcome is in any given circumstance depends heavily upon the opportunity costs of 
abatement.  Along the optimal path, if the marginal improvement in the environment from one more unit of 
abatement is more valuable than the corresponding value of consuming the output that would be 
surrendered to the abatement process, then abatement will rise.  A change in the assimilation rate changes 
the level of pollution that would otherwise exist in every time period, ceteris paribus.  That changes the 
marginal benefit of abatement, but it also indirectly impacts other parts of the system and can also alter the 








Next in line is γ, the return to capital.  While this parameter is not impacted by the type of 
pollutant, it will certainly vary across countries.  The level of technology enjoyed by a country will 
certainly impact the productivity of capital, as will the relative size of the labor force.   
 A higher return to capital increases the benefits of production, which could then lead to an 
increase in total production and, if abatement remains constant, emissions.  However, as noted above, a 
shift in the production constraint is only half of the question.  Optimality requires that MRTS = MRS, and a 
shift in the production constraint can result in either an increase or a decrease in the optimal level of 
production, consumption, and abatement.  It is possible that society will choose the same level of output 
and consumption, and spend the increased “income” on increased abatment, if the improvement in the 
environment will yield a higher level of utility.  Fig. 3e exhibits two characteristics that indicate that the 
result is somewhere in between the two possible outcomes discussed: (1) emissions and pollution remain 
essentially the same; and (2) the stationary state level of capital has increased.  The fact that emissions and 
pollution have increased only slightly indicates that the social planner has chosen to increase abatement, so 









abatement to the point where environmental quality is higher than it was before.  In other words, the social 
planner appears to have chosen to keep environmental quality constant.  The fact that the stationary state 
level of capital has increased indicates that the increase in total ou put is sufficient to maintain 
environmental quality and spend more on either consumption and investment.  The stationary state level of 
emissions is the same, but the stationary state level of pollution appears to be slightly higher.  Additionally, 
it is clear that the turning point of pollution occurs at bo h a higher level of capital and pollution.  It appears 
that greater productivity leads to a higher total burden on the environment, although for much of the time 
path, the social planner maintains a constant environmental quality. 
 Finally, we turn to the pollution intensity of production, represented by the parameter σ.  The 
value of σ will vary according to the technology that a society enjoys, and it will vary across industries.  It 
represents the ratio of pollution to total productive output, and different production processes will yield 
different levels of pollution per unit of output.  Additionally, a more developed society may have 
productive processes that better utilize inputs so as to minimize wasteful and, often polluting, byproducts. 
 An increase in the pollution intensity raises the total emission  when production remains constant, 
yet it also increases the cost of production, which could reduce production and potentially reduce total 
emissions.  We would anticipate that, as σ increases, and therefore pollution per unit of output increases, 
that the social planner will realize that increased pollution will cause a decrease in utility, and that the 
decrease in utility can be countered by giving up some output (and therefore consumption) in order to 
engage in greater levels of abatement.  The social planner will beg n to increase abatement, and therefore 
reduce output that can be utilized for consumption, so that the marginal utilities of consumption and 
environmental quality are equal, as required by the first-order conditions.  Fig. 3f shows the emissions and 
pollution paths prior to and after the increase in σ.  The stationary state level of emissions and pollution are 
lower after the increase in σ, but that does not tell the entire story.  Fig. 3g shows a magnified section of the 
emissions curve, and the emissions paths cross shortly after the turning point. 
 As mentioned previously, the literature never considers the possibility that the emissions curves 
and pollution curves may cross after a parameter shift.  For the purposes of most analyses, simple 





Fig. 3f.  Increase in pollution intensity of production (sigma) from 0.45 to 0.46. 
 
 




intuitive.  In fact, most of them are likely accurate over a wide range of parameter values, but Fig. 3g 
illustrates that not only may our simple intuitive assumptions regarding a shift up or down be incorrect for 
any given parameter value, but it may be that the dynamic nature of the environment and economy may 
lead to completely unexpected results, such as the emissions curves crossing.  The explanation for the 
emissions curves crossing can be thought of as the inverse of the explanation for the time paths crossing as 
the convexity parameter, b2, increases.  Recall that, when the cost function became more convex, abatement 
increased, and society avoided higher levels of emissions and pollution until much later in the development 
process, so that society settled into a higher stationary state level of emissions and pollution.  The converse 
occurs when the pollution intensity parameter, σ, increases, as emissions rise faster and society reaches 
more quickly the maximum level of emissions it is willing to accept.  Thus, society reaches its turning point 
earlier in the development process, and both begins the process of improving the environment earlier.  And 
because the emissions level at the turning point is higher, society chooses a more rapid process of 
improving the environment, so that the slope of the emission  curve in Fig. 3g is much steeper and the 
emissions curves cross. 
 Figs. 3a through 3g illustrate that while the simple, intuitive assumptions that are regularly made 
regarding the impact of parameters values are often true, they are likely not universally true.  Table 2 
contains a summary of the predictions utilized by Kelly (2003) and others and contrasts them to the results 





Parameter changed ∆ in emissions path ∆ in pollution path 
  Predicted Actual Predicted Actual 
 b2  ( - ) ( - ) then ( + ) ( - ) ( - ) then ( + ) 
 α ( + ) ( + ) ( + ) ( + ) 
 δ2 ( + ) ( + ) ( + ) ( + ) 
 γ ( + ) ( + ) ( + ) ( + ) 
 σ ( + ) ( + ) then ( - ) ( + ) ( + ) then ( - ) 





This is not to argue that we should not make the kind of assumptions that make economic analysis 
possible.  Rather, we must simply be more careful in assuming that a single assumption will always be 
applicable, especially since we have the capability to check the validity of the assumptions.  As noted by 
Johansson and Kristrom (2007), there is every reason to suspect that we will have to account for income 
and substitution effects any time environmental quality and consumption are complements.  
 
3.4.  Conclusion 
 
 For too long, proponents and opponents of EKC theory have fought over the empirical results 
achieved on both sides.  Researchers have utilized a wide variety of assumptions to arrive at their results, 
and those results have been just as varied as the underlying assumptions.  Moreover, competing 
assumptions have all been based on reasonable probabilities.  Even theoretical models, such as Kelly 
(2003), make assumptions that might not hold up under fairly standard conditions.  One simple truth that 
underlies the EKC debate is that these contrary assumptions cannot be simultaneously correct but that does 
not mean that both sides cannot be correct, if the assumptions are being made along different ranges of 
parameter and variable values.  EKC literature has, to a large extent, ignored the possibility that even the 
most intuitive assumption may be incorrect along some plausible range of parameter and variable values, 
yet understanding which assumptions are correct may vary depen ing on the circumstances of a given 
country or the characteristics of a given pollutant. 
The simple model employed by this research reveals results that run contrary to some basic 
assumptions, although plausible explanations are offered for each s emingly counter-intuitive result.  These 
results do not, in any way, disprove any previous research, but rather offer a reason to believe that 
contradictory studies need not be mutually exclusive.  It is hoped that by eliminating the need to demand 
that any researcher has conducted a flawed study simply because the results do not match previous studies, 
EKC literature may progress instead to understanding why the results vary.  Specifically, by taking a 
careful look at the conditions of the competing studies, we can gain greater insight into when we might 
expect each result to hold and, therefore, understand better which policies are needed at any given time in 






DIRTY VERSUS CLEAN CONSUMPTION 
 
 
4.1.  Introduction 
 
EKC theory poses interesting questions regarding the intraction of the economy and the 
environment--two inherently complex systems.  Of course, gr ater complexity can be added as the effects 
of other factors, such as international trade relations, are considered.  Each EKC model deals with the 
complexity in its own way.  Beyond simple models, such as the one presented in the previous chapter, EKC 
literature begins to add levels of complexity that allow for the exploration of various possibilities as 
economics and environment collide.  With increasing levels of complexity, it can be even more tempting to 
focus on the intriguing conclusions that can be reached, but we believe that it is just as important, or 
perhaps more so, to focus on the assumptions that are used when constructing additional layers of 
complexity.  One possible layer of complexity that can be added is the opportunity for societies to produce 
and consume higher cost, lower polluting goods.  If society, given the choice between two goods, is 
allowed to choose an alternative consumption good, one which results in lower levels of emissions, will 
such choices affect the possibility of empirical results consistent with an EKC?  Copeland and Taylor 
(2004) point out the usefulness of a two-good model, where the goods differ in their pollution intensity, in 
investigating patterns of trade, and the “pollution haven hypothesis,” and we believe that it is just as helpful 
in a single-country model. 
Changes in private consumption and production choices towards “green” consumption and 
production are quite common in environmental economics but have not been widely used in EKC literature.  
One story that can be told regarding the emergence of an EKC is that, as society distances itself from 
subsistence level, the willingness to sacrifice consumption for additional environmental quality increases.  
In our previous model, that change was achievable only by an increase in abatement efforts.  This chapter 
allows society an additional alternative, to produce and consume a different “green” type of good, one that 
costs more to produce42 but which provides society with both consumption benefits and environmental 
                                                
 42 Examples of such would be wind and solar energy, which are more expensive than coal-fired electricity, 




benefits.  Society will choose the green good to the extent that he environmental benefits of the green good 
outweigh the additional costs of production.  We also address the primary question of this research, 
whether the common assumptions of EKC literature are universal across all reasonable parameter values. 
Once again, we establish a continuous time, deterministic model, tracking a social planner’s 
decisions through time.  The social planner chooses production and consumption of two goods, one which 
contributes relatively more to environmental degradation thane other.  By choosing consumption levels 
below production levels, the social planner can increase the futur  capital stock, allowing for greater future 
consumption.  The social planner also chooses the level of abatement in each industry, by which processes 
total emissions are decreased.  In the previous model, the social planner could improve the environment by 
increasing abatement efforts.  Now, the social planner can shift production to the green good, which will 
reduce total emissions, ceteris paribus; the social planner can now also modify abatement levels in both 
industries, controlling total emissions through additional means. 
 
4.2.  The model 
Once again, we return to a primitive society, wherein the social planner makes multiple decisions 
with the ultimate goal of maximizing societal utility, ( )ttytx mccU −, .  Society gets utility from consumption 
and environmental quality.  Society gains just consumption utility from consuming the dirty good x, cxt, just 
environmental utility from environmental quality, (-mt), and both from consumption of the green good y, 
cyt.  As a real-world example, think of the question asked by clerks at grocery stores: “paper or plastic?”  
Some utility is gained from use of a plastic bag to carry groceries home.  Many people, however, 
experience additional utility from using the paper bag, not because paper is an inherently superior material 
for carrying most groceries, but rather because the use of the paper b g represents to the consumer an 
improvement in the environment as fewer non-biodegradable products reach local landfills.   
Of course, most grocery stores do not charge extra if you select the paper bag, but many real-
world green goods are more expensive than the corresponding dirty substitute.  This fact can be explained 
by two factors: first, because there is some additional amount of environmental utility to be gained from 




production is often more expensive than dirty production, and therefore requires a higher sale price in order 
to cover the cost of production.  This latter assumption is one of the fundamental explanations for the 
emergence of an EKC, that society may not be capable of cleaning up the environment until incomes rise 
enough to allow society to afford cleaner production processes.  Moreover, the continued consumption of 
dirty goods even when higher utility green goods are available is evidence that there must be some 
additional cost associated with the green good.  We assume the societal utility function to be twice 


















































Production, ( )tF k , is achieved as the social planner allocates capital, kt,
43 between the clean and 
dirty industries, ( ) ( ) ( )( )tttytttxtt kFkFkF ∆−+∆= 1 .  The variable t∆ , [ ]1,0∈∆ t  represents the percentage of 
capital that is allocated to industry x.  We assume a continuous, twice differentiable production function, 





























kF .  Implicit in this assumption is 
that the production process experiences constant-returns-to-scale in l inputs.  Because labor is held 
constant, this society experiences diminishing-returns-to-scale in capital. 
The production process produces a pollution byproduct, mt, which degrades the environment and 
thereby reduces societal utility.  The pollution intensity parameter, σi, i = x,y,  [ ]1,0∈iσ , represents the 
corresponding level of pollution emitted per unit of output.  As mentioned, however, production of the 
clean good results in lower levels of pollution per unit of output, 
yx σσ > .  Thus, the total level of 
emissions for a given industry, assuming full capital alloc tion to that industry, would be ( )tii kFσ ; and the 
total level of emissions for society, absent abatement efforts, would be ( ) ( )( )ttyyttxx kFkF ∆−+∆ 1σσ .  We 
assume constant values for σi, but we allow for the possibility of a cleaner environment through natural 
assimilation and abatement efforts. 
                                                
 43 As in Chapter 3, above, kt represents the capital stock, the per-capita capital stock, and the capital-to-labor 




Our social planner lacks the capacity to remove pollution from the environment once emitted.  The 
environment, however, has the capacity to assimilate a certain percentage of pollution, which we represent 
by the assimilation rate, [ ]1,02 ∈δ .  We assume only one pollutant, common to both production processes; 
therefore, natural assimilation occurs at the same rate, regardless of the source industry.  The social planner 
is not helpless to aid the environment, however.  As noted, she can shift production to the clean industry, 
which yields a lower level of emissions per unit of output.  She can also engage in abatement efforts in each 
industry, eliminating some percentage of the emissions that would otherwise be emitted during the 
production process, [ ]1,0∈itu , i = x,y, ]1,0[∈iu .  While the social planner may choose different levels of 
abatement for each industry, she has at her disposal only one form o  abatement technology, so one 
abatement cost function, ( )tuGG = , is applied to total production from each industry.  We assume a 















uG , where 
( )ituG  is a unit cost function representing the portion of each unit of output that is relinquished in order to 
achieve uit, the desired level of pollution abatement, ( ) [ ]1,0∈ituG . 
Putting all of this together, total gross emissions are defined by:  
( ) ( )( )ttyyttxx kFkF ∆−+∆ 1σσ ,  
and total net emissions, after abatement, are defined by:  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )ttyyytttxxxtt kFukFue ∆−−+∆−= 111 σσ .   
Total abatement expenditures are defined by:  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )[ ]tttytttxtttyyttttxxt kFkFkFuGkFuG ∆−+∆∈∆−+∆ 1,01 .  
Society must balance the desire for a clean environment with the desire for current and future 
consumption.  Thus, total potential output, ( ) ( )( )tttytttx kFkF ∆−+∆ 1 , is reduced by the total cost of 
abatement, yielding the post-abatement output, ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )yttttyxttttx uGkFuGkF −∆−+−∆ 111 .  Society can 
choose to utilize total potential output in one of three ways: consume it today; engage in pollution 




decision would lead to the society’s budget constraint,  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) 0111 =−−−−∆−+−∆ tytxtyttttyxttttx zccuGkFuGkF ,  
in which the investment choice is denoted by zt .  However, the system of equations generated in this 
chapter is an unstable system, so the optimal path can be difficult to derive.  In order to aid in the process of 
deriving the optimal time path of the system, certain constraints must be imposed.  The constraint we 
choose is that only good y may be invested in future capital development, so that the social planner 
allocates capital to industry x only in such amounts as are necessary to yield, after abatement, the optimal 
level of consumption of x.  In other words, we impose the consumption constraint: 
( ) ( )( )xttttxxt uGkFc −∆= 1 , which leads to investment being defined as ( )( ) ( )( ) ytyttttyt cuGkFz −−∆−= 11 . 
Investment and depreciation of capital, [ ]1,01 ∈δ , define the law of motion for capital: 
( )( ) ( )( ) tytttttytt kcuGkFkzdt
dk
11 11 δδ −−−∆−=−= .  Higher levels of capital in future time periods allow 
for higher total output and, therefore, higher levels of consumption of both goods.  With rising capital 
stocks, it is possible for society to enjoy higher levels of consumption of both goods even while increasing 
abatement and improving the environment.  The state of the environment is determined by the level of post 
abatement emissions in any time period and the amount of pollution that has been assimilated into the 
environment, according to the following function:  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) tttxxxtttyyyttt mkFukFumedt
md
22 111 δσσδ +∆−−∆−−−=+−=
− . 
 After imposing the consumption constraint, so that cx is no longer an express variable, the 
forward-looking social planner faces the following problem: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )







































This is the present value specification of the problem, so all future utility is discounted to the present time.  
The control variables for the model are cyt, uxt, uyt, and ∆t; the state variables are kt and –mt. 
 Thus, the present-value Hamiltonian is: 
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]












−−−∆−+−−∆= −  
where 
tψ  is the present-value, co-state variable for capital, and tξ  is the present-value, co-state variable for 
a clean environment.  These variables represent the value of the marginal unit of the state variables to 
society.  The parameter ρ is the discount factor, which will be positive under an assumption of a positive 
rate of time preference. 
We assume that the marginal product of capital will always be positive, so an additional unit of 
capital represents some additional amount of income.  As such, society should, ceteris paribus, always 
place a positive value on one additional unit of capital.  In addition, society should always place a positive 
value on an additional unit of a clean environment, leading to positive values for tψ  and tξ . 
 We now develop our first-order conditions, which define equilibrium conditions for all control 
variables, along with laws of motion for co-state variables.  We establish the equilibrium conditions for the 
control variables by taking the partial derivatives of the Hamiltonian with respect to the individual control 
variables and setting them equal to zero.  We next find the laws of motion for the co-state variables by 
taking the negative partial derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to the state variables.  The final 
first-order conditions are the laws of motion for the state variables, as defined previously. 
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d     4.6) 
 ( )( ) ( )( ) kcuGkF
dt
dk
yyy 111 δ−−−∆−=    4.7) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] mkFukFu
dt
md
yyyxxx 2111 δσσ +∆−−+∆−−=
−   4.8) 
Note that, as with the simple model from the previous chapter, the law of motion for the co-state variable 
for capital continues to include the externality of p llution.  This means that this model will have th  same 
difficulty as the simple model, in that pollution will tend to feed itself, creating a feedback loop that has the 
potential of continually increasing pollution levels.  
 Eq. (4.1) is the partial derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to consumption of y. Eqs. (4.2) 
and (4.3) are the partial derivatives of the Hamilton an with respect to abatement in industries x and y, 
respectively.  Eq. (4.4) is the partial derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to the capital allocation 
variable, ∆t.  The current value forms were obtained by multiplying through each present value equation by 
eρt. Eqs. (4.5) and (4.6) are the laws of motion for the costate variables, ψλ ρte=  and ξϕ ρte= .  Finally, 
Eqs. (4.7) and (4.8) are the laws of motion for the state variables. 
 Eq. (4.1) indicates that the level of consumption of the clean good chosen will be such that the 
marginal value from the last unit of the clean good c nsumed will be equal to the marginal value of capital, 
which represents future consumption.  Note that this decision also implicates a choice by the social planner 
with respect to capital allocation, as consumption of the clean good is only possible to the extent that 
capital is allocated to production of the clean good.  Investment choices are also implicated, as investm nt 
in future consumption is defined by the difference between production of the clean good and consumption 
of the clean good. 
Eq. (4.2) indicates the level of equilibrium pollution abatement that will take place in industry x 
















side of the equation represents the loss to society as abatement reduces the level of good x that can be 
consumed.  The right-hand side is the gain to society as the level of pollution from industry x is reduced.  
Eq. (4.3) indicates the level of equilibrium pollution abatement that will take place in industry y along the 
optimal time path, and follows a similar pattern to that seen in (4.2).  We rewrite the equation as: 







∆− 11 ϕσλ .  The right-hand side mirrors Eq. (4.2), showing the gain to society as 
abatement reduces the level of pollution from industry y.  The left-hand side of the equation is the loss t 
society as abatement in industry y reduces both consumption of good y and future capital; the marginal cost 












G , is multiplied by the marginal production of capitl, ( )( )( )kFy ∆−1 , and the 
shadow value of capital (λ). 
 Eq. (4.4) indicates the optimal choice of capital allocation between industries in equilibrium along 
the optimal path.  Before explaining the equation, we restate that any change in one variable will cause the 
entire system of equations to change; such is the nature of a dynamic system such as this.  We begin by 































σσϕλ 111 .  As ∆ increases (decreases), output 
is gained (lost) in industry x, but lost (gained) in industry y.  The equation shows that society willchoose 
an equilibrium between environmental and non-enviromental goods.  The left-hand side represents the 
non-environmental goods.  By assuming an increase in ∆, the first term represents the increase in utility 
from increasing consumption of good x, while the second term shows the loss in future consumption as 
total investment declines.  The right-hand side represents environmental goods.  The net change in total 
pollution is multiplied by the value to society of ne more unit of a clean environment.  If total output 
increases due to a change in allocation of capital, society is benefited with additional income but is 
burdened with a less clean environment. 
 First-order conditions (4.5) and (4.6) are the laws of motion for the co-state variables.  As capital 
accumulates and production rises, income rises, making society better off, but that improvement may be 
offset by increases in the level of pollution.  Whether society is ultimately better or worse off depends upon 




With regard to the value of the costate variable for capital, the increase in income tends to reduce the value 
of the costate variable, and the increase in polluti n ends to cause the value to increase.  Likewise, a  
pollution increases, the value of a clean environmet rises, for the increase in pollution has lowered the 
stock of environmental quality.  The level of abatement chosen by society for each industry can lessen the 
amount of pollution and, therefore, slow the growth of the value of the costate variable for a clean 
environment.  The fact that pollution assimilates into the environment would initially appear to also sl w 
the growth of the value of the costate variable, but in fact, it may not due to the complexities of the 
dynamic system.44  First-order conditions (4.7) and (4.8) are the laws of motion for capital and a clean 
environment, governed jointly by the laws of the physical world in which the society lives, as well as the 
choices made in terms of abatement and consumption. 
 Now we must define functional forms for utility, cost, and production functions. First, the utility 
function will continue as a Cobb-Douglas utility function, although with the additional clean good added, 
and we continue to have exponents that sum to one. Second, since we assume a uniform set of abatement 
technologies, we need only one cost function and ca therefore retain the cost function used in the previous 
model.  Third, each industry employs the same production function utilized in the previous model.  The 
societal production function is simply the aggregat production from both industries after a determinatio  
of the capital allocation between them.  Thus, the returns to capital and pollution intensity parameters for 
both industries will have different values to represent the increased pollution cost of the “dirty” good and 
the increased output cost of the “green” good.  
With these points in mind, we write the functional forms as follows: 
























( ) ( ) 1γkAkFx ∆=∆     (4.10) 
( )( ) ( )( ) 211 γkAkFy ∆−=∆−    (4.11) 
( ) 210 bii ubbuG +=     (4.12) 
                                                




This specification for utility allows us to vary the strength of the complementary relationship between 
consumption goods and a clean environment by varying the level of η.  Any value less than one results in a 
complementary relationship, and as the value of η decreases, the complementary relationship weakens. 
 Applying the functional forms to our current-value first-order conditions yields: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) 01 11111102 212121 =−−−−∆ −−−−−− λα ηααηαηαγ mmcubbkA ybx  (4.1a) 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) 01 12121212 1111110111 =∆−−−−∆− −−−−−−− γηααηαηαγ ϕσα kmmcubbkAub xybxbx  (4.2a) 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) 011 121 222 =∆−+∆− −byy ubbkk γγ λϕσ   (4.3a) 
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22 11 δγ −−−−∆−=    (4.7a) 




21 111 δσσ γγ +∆−−−∆−−=
−   (4.8a) 
 
4.3.  Solving the system 
4.3.1.  The system 
 We again utilize Matlab to solve the system of equations for the stationary state.  After finding the
set of parameters that allow for a stationary state, we make marginal changes to various parameters, and 
check to see what impact the changes have on the syst m variables.  We begin by transforming the system 
of equations into their discrete form, following the procedure utilized in Chapter 3, to obtain the following 
system of discrete equations:45 
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mmcubbkAub  (4.2b) 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) 011 222 11211 =∆−−∆−− +−+ γγ σϕλβ ttytbytttt kubbk   (4.3b) 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( )( ) ( )













































( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )








































  (4.5b) 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( ) ( )211111021 1111 212121 δβϕηααϕ ηηααηαηαγ −+−−−∆−−−−= +−−+−− tybxt mmcubbkA  (4.6b) 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )kcubbkAk ybyt 1101 111 22 δγ −+−−−∆−=+   (4.7b) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )mkAukAum yyxxt 21 1111 21 δσσ γγ −+∆−−+∆−=+  (4.8c) 
This system of equations can be solved by Matlab once parameter values have been chosen.46  The 
increased complexity of the system, over that which existed in the previous chapter, means that greater c r  
must be taken in choosing the parameter values, so that a stationary state may be determined.  We have
included in Table 3 the values chosen for the parameters, used to determine the initial stationary state.  
The first thing that will likely be apparent to the r ader is that the parameters in Table 3 are, in 
some cases, different from those listed in Table 1.  As discussed previously, the system of equations s 
inherently unstable, indicating that derivation of the optimal path is computationally difficult.  Parameter 
values must be chosen so as to allow for derivation of multiple optimal time path, as each parameter is 
modified.  Moreover, the intent of this chapter is not to directly contrast the results of the previous simple 
model with this more complicated model.  Rather, the purpose is to conduct the same type of analysis, 
                                                





Table 3   
Parameter values for examples 
    
Parameter  Value 
 γ1 0.4 
 γ2 0.3 
 A 0.6 
 σx 0.22 
 σy 0.13 
 η 0.9 
 b0 0.01 
 b1 0.01 
 b2 2 
 α1 0.3 
 α2 0.5 
 δ1 0.1 
 δ2 0.1 
 ρ 0.05 
m  26 
 
changing the parameters and identifying how the change in parameter values impacts the optimal time 
paths and stationary state values of the system variables.  As such, we need to assure that the parameter 
values are within acceptable limits. 
 The productivity parameters, γ1 and γ2, are both less than 1, assuring that our assumption of 
diminishing returns to scale in production is met.  Further, γ1 < γ2 in order to represent the higher 
production cost of the clean good.  Technology is between 0 and 1, 0 < A < 1, to represent that capital is 
productive but not perfectly efficient.  The pollution intensity parameters, σx and σy, are between 0 and 1, as 
defined above, to represent that production results in pollution, but that the amount of pollution is less than 
the amount of output.  The pollution intensity parameter for the dirty good, x, is higher than that for the 
clean good, y.  We require that 0 < η < 1 in order to guarantee that there is complementarity between 
consumption and environmental quality.  The fixed an variable costs of abatement, b0 and b1 respectively, 




function shape parameter, b2, is greater than 1 to assure convexity.  The utility shares of good x and good y, 
α1 and α2, respectively, are between 0 and 1 in order to guarantee that society receives positive utility from 
consumption of each good subject to diminishing marginal utility.  Further, α1 < α2, representing that 
society receives additional utility from the environmental benefits of consuming the clean good.  The 
depreciation rate and assimilation rates are between 0 and 1, so that capital and pollution stocks depreciate 
over time.  The parameter ρ is set at what we believe is a reasonable discount rate.  Finally, m  is obviously 
much higher than in the previous chapter, but the only requirement for m  is that it be greater than 0, so 
that the environment will have some positive maximum carrying capacity.  The society represented by the 
parameter values in Table 3, then, lives in an enviro ment with a much higher carrying capacity.  
 
4.3.2.  Stationary state 
 
For every set of parameters, there exists a unique optimal path, and an infinite number of non-
optimal paths.  Choosing parameters that fairly reflect what a representative economy may look like allows 
us to derive optimal solutions that give insight into the impact of various parameters on the real world, 
parameters over which society may be capable of exerting influence.  By comparing sets of parameters and 
their corresponding optimal solutions, we can determine what effect changing those parameters may have
on the optimal time path and stationary state level of emissions and pollution.47  If we also compare the 
impact of those parameter changes on the stationary st te levels of other variables, we may gain insight into 
exactly how changes in parameters impact emissions and pollution.  It is possible to offer predictions a  to 
the likely outcome resulting from a change in parameter values, as will be discussed below, yet the fact that 
this remains a dynamic system means that changing one parameter value may alter the time path of every 
variable, making precise predictions extremely difficult.  Better than predictions are actual results measured 
as parameter values are modified and the resulting s ationary states are compared.  
 
4.3.2.1.  Stationary state for capital 
 
Generally speaking, an increase in productivity parameters γx and γy, the level of technology, A, 
                                                
 47 The reader will note that in the following exercise certain parameters are increased and others are 
decreased.  This is not an indication that we believ  that an increase or decrease is more likely in reality.  Rather, the 




and the parameters representing the share of utility generated by consumption, α1 or α2, correspond to an 
increase in the marginal benefit of capital.  An increase in the productivity parameters or the level of 
technology would mean that the same amount of capital yields a higher level of output and that each unit of 
capital has a higher value to society.  An increase in the utility parameters would mean that the same 
amount of capital yields the same level of output, b t that level of output is capable of yielding a higher 
total utility along the optimal path, also indicating that each unit of capital has a higher value to society.  Of 
course, the fact that each unit of capital has a higher value to society is not a sufficient condition f r a 
higher stationary state.  It also means that society an reach the same level of utility from consumption with 
a lower level of capital and could, in such a situat on, enjoy a higher level of environmental quality.  
Additionally, increases in the utility parameters could also create incentives to reduce the rate of capital 
accumulation.  An increase in the utility gained from consuming each unit of good x will tend to increase 
production and consumption of good x, and that can lead to a reduction in production of good y, which is 
needed for investment in future capital.  An increase in the utility gained from consuming each unit of g od 
y will tend to increase production and consumption of good y, but, if the increase in consumption of good y 
outpaces the increase in production of good y, there will be a lower amount of good y available to invest in 
future capital. 
To further complicate the matter, increasing only one production parameter or only one utility 
parameter will alter the MRTS or the MRS, respectively.  As the production parameters are altered, the 
MRTS changes, and production of one of the goods will become relatively more attractive.  Similarly, as
the utility parameters are altered, the MRS changes, and one good will become relatively more attractive as 
compared to the other good, and both goods will become relatively more attractive as compared to 
environmental quality.  The resulting shifts in the equilibrium, where MRS = MRTS, make it difficult to 
predict the outcome.  This difficulty is inherent in any complex dynamic system, and it is why the 
following analysis is important.  Any parameter in such a system will directly or indirectly impact every 
variable, and making assumptions regarding the impact of changing a single parameter is likely to 
underestimate, if not completely ignore, at least one f many ways in which the parameter change affects 




An increase in the depreciation of capital, δ1, can be thought of as a decrease in the value of 
capital  As capital depreciates faster, the future st am of income represented by each unit of capital is 
reduced.  The fact that the stationary state level of capital decreases as δ1 increases is perhaps not 
surprising, but it should not be assumed that such is t e only possible result.  Instead, consider that society 
will realize that achieving the same level of consumption is possible by increasing capital accumulation.  
Such a choice will have to be balanced against other options, including obtaining the same level of 
consumption by reducing abatement or simply accepting lower consumption.  Ex ante, it would be 
impossible to have any confidence in predicting what t e outcome will be.  The very real possibility tha  
traditional assumptions, often relying heavily on price effects not income effects, may be incorrect under 
certain circumstances should reinforce the importance of investigating the validity of the assumptions used. 
Certain other parameters can be understood as indicative of the cost of capital, such as the 
pollution intensity parameters, σx or σy, or the various abatement cost parameters, b0, b1, and b2.  As the 
pollution intensity parameters increase, the same lev l of production results in a higher level of pollution, 
assuming constant abatement levels.  As the cost of using capital increases, we would anticipate that 
society would choose a lower level of capital along the optimal path.  Of course, society has the power to 
choose a higher level of abatement in order to counter, at least somewhat, the tendency towards increased 
pollution.  That increased abatement would not be costless and would divert output away from 
consumption and, in the case of industry y, away from future capital accumulation. 
Changes in the abatement cost parameters impact capital ccumulation in a number of ways.  The 
first impact is similar to the impact of a change in the pollution intensity parameters.  An increase in the 
fixed and variable costs of capital, b0 and b1, means that maintaining the same environmental quality at the 
same level of capital will be more expensive.  Thus, the cost of using capital, in terms of environmental 
quality, has increased, which would tend to decrease c pital accumulation along the optimal time path.  T e 
second impact is that as the fixed and variable costs f capital increase, the level of abatement would tend 
to decrease.  Lower levels of abatement would then end to lead to higher levels of production, allowing 
greater consumption and investment along the optimal path.  An increase in the convexity parameter of 




larger range of abatement choices.  This will tend to increase the level of abatement, which in turn tends to 
decrease capital accumulation along the optimal path. 
More complicated is the effect of an increase in the depreciation rate for pollution, δ2.  As δ2 
increases, pollution emitted during production assimilates more quickly into the environment.  Pollution 
left alone, then, will disappear much more rapidly, and abating pollution in the current time period yields 
fewer benefits as a result of the natural abatement that occurs.  All of this lessens the incentive to forego 
consumption and investment in the current time period in order to preserve a clean environment for future 
time periods.  Thus, ceteris paribus, a higher assimilation rate, will tend to increase total net production, 
and therefore higher consumption and investment.  
 Table 4a indicates that most of our predicted results have been realized.  Increasing the 
productivity of capital in either industry results in an increase in the stationary state level of capital.  Thus, 
the increase in capital’s value to society must outweigh any of the other confounding effects mentioned 
above.  As technology increases, and the efficiency of capital increases, society also chooses a higher 
stationary state level of capital.  Likewise, as the pollution intensity parameter in industry y is increased, the 
cost of using capital in production of good y increases, and society chooses a lower stationary st te level of 
capital.  However, our predictions regarding σx and its impact on the time path of capital are not borne out 
by the results.  It is a reasonable assumption that a decrease in σx should increase capital accumulation over 
time, because the pollution costs of each unit of capital have decreased.  Instead, a lower pollution cost of 
production leads to a lower level of capital in thestationary state.  There are a number of possible reasons 
for this outcome.  It is possible that, as the pollution intensity is reduced, the level of abatement also 
declines.  If that decline is substantial enough, then less capital is needed in order to achieve the same level 
of consumption (i.e., the income effects would dominate).  Along the same lines, a decrease in the pollution 
intensity of good x means that the societal cost of good x has declined, and more of that good should be 
produced.  If that production is the result of increased investment, then capital should increase as a re ult.  
If, however, an increase in the production of good x is primarily the result of a substitution of capitl from 
good y to good x, then the higher productivity of capital in the dirty industry may mean that less capital is 





Table 4a    






Increase γx from 0.4 to 0.41 1.9522 1.9673 ( + ) 
Increase γy from 0.3 to 0.31 1.9522 2.0244 ( + ) 
Increase A from 0.6 to 0.61 1.9522 1.9989 ( + ) 
Decrease σ1 from 0.22 to 0.21 1.9522 1.9517 ( - ) 
Increase σ2 from 0.13 to 0.14 1.9522 1.9515 ( - ) 
Decrease η from 0.9 to 0.5 1.9522 1.9522 even 
Increase b0 from 0.01 to 0.011 1.9522 1.9494 ( - ) 
Increase b1 from 0.01 to 0.011 1.9522 1.9511 ( - ) 
Increase b2 from 2 to 2.1 1.9522 1.9519 ( - ) 
Increase α1 from 0.3 to 0.31 1.9522 1.972 ( + ) 
Decrease α2 from 0.5 to 0.495 1.9522 1.9583 ( + ) 
Increase δ1 from 0.1 to 0.11 1.9522 1.7738 ( - ) 
Increase δ2 from 0.1 to 0.2 1.9522 1.9536 ( + ) 
. i 
 
Increases in the costs of abatement lead to a decrease in the stationary state level of capital 
because the cost of using capital in an environmentally friendly manner has now increased.  Using capital 
in a non-environmentally friendly way will result in lower utility as the environment is degraded.  In sum, 
there is an increase in the cost of using capital, so society chooses a lower stationary state level of capital.  
Likewise, increasing the convexity of the abatement cost function means that the marginal cost of 
abatement has decreased and abatement is therefore less costly.  An increase in abatement would lessen th  
level of output potentially available for investment, and therefore lessen the stationary state level of capital.  
Note, however, that both increases and decreases in the cost of abatement can yield the same impact on the 
stationary state level of capital, reinforcing the fact that we should be very careful in our assumptions 
regarding the impacts of parameter change. 
As society receives greater utility from the production of good x, it necessarily receives less utility 
from a clean environment, so society is willing to choose a higher stationary state level of capital, and
likely a corresponding higher level of pollution.  However, a decrease in the utility society receives from 
good y also yields a higher level of capital in the stationary state.  The decrease means that society gains
greater utility from a clean environment, yet society chooses a higher level of capital, which can result in a 




counter the impacts of a higher capital stock.   
As capital depreciates at a higher rate, society ma take certain steps in an attempt to counter the 
more rapid deterioration of the capital stock, but, at least in this case, it is not fully effective, and the 
stationary state level of capital decreases.  Finally, s pollution assimilates at a faster rate, society reacts to 
the lower cost of using capital in production by choosing a higher stationary state level of capital.  
 
4.3.2.2.  Stationary state for consumption 
 
We turn next to the impact of parameter change on the levels of consumption for both goods.  An 
increase in the productivity factors for each industry gives society the opportunity to consume more.  
Ceteris paribus, whichever industry experiences the increase in productivity will see an increase in output.  
Of course, the system is dynamic, so it is highly unlikely that everything else will remain constant.  As 
productivity rises, society could choose a higher leve  of abatement, leaving consumption constant but 
allowing society to experience higher environmental quality.  Alternatively, society may shift capital to the 
other industry, thus allowing for an increase in both goods.  One additional possibility is that society will 
choose a higher level of investment, so as to allow greater consumption in future time periods.  Ex ante, it 
is difficult to predict with certainty the changes society will choose to implement in reaction to productivity 
changes. 
An increase in the technology parameter means that capital, in general, is more efficient, 
regardless of the industry in which it is put to use.  As such, an increase in technology would allow f r 
greater production in both industries, so we would anticipate that there would be an increase in 
consumption of both goods.  Increases in the polluti n intensity parameters means that production and,
therefore, consumption of each good becomes more exp nsive in terms of the environmental costs of 
consumption.  We should therefore expect a reduction in consumption of the good for which there has been 
an increase in pollution intensity.  As society shift  capital, we would also expect an increase in 
consumption of the good for which there has been no i crease in pollution intensity. 
As the fixed and variable costs of abatement increase, we would expect consumption of both 
goods to decrease, as it becomes more expensive to produce and, therefore, consume in an environmentally 




decrease, so producing in an environmentally friendly way becomes cheaper, and we would expect greater 
production of both goods, which could then be consumed.  An increase in the depreciation rate for capital 
suggests more capital would need to be saved in order to maintain consumption at the current level.  Since 
investment is only possible to the extent that consumption is foregone, it is likely that an increase in the 
capital depreciation rate will cause a decrease in consumption of both goods.  Finally, as the pollution 
assimilation rate increases, current pollution is le s costly, so society could reduce abatement in both
industries and achieve greater output with the same level of capital, which could then be consumed.  
Comparing these reasonably standard predictions with the actual results, we note certain 
disparities.  Rather than being troubling, however, these disparities merely confirm what was discovered in 
the previous chapter--standard assumptions regarding complex dynamic systems, though seemingly 
reasonable, should be confirmed through further investigation before being relied upon.  Each parameter 
impacts the optimal path of multiple variables directly, and all variables indirectly; even the most logically 
crafted assumption can fail in the face of increasing complexity.  By looking at Tables 4b and 4c, we se  
that an increase in γx causes an increase in consumption of x and a decrease in consumption of y, but that an 
increase in γy yields an increase in consumption of both goods.  Thus, in the case of γx, substitution effects 
appear to dominate, while in the case of γy, income effects dominate.  An increase in technology yields an 
increase in consumption of both goods, as more effici nt capital allows for increased production of both 
goods.  
 Changes in the pollution intensity parameters have some unexpected results.  As industry x 
becomes less pollution intensive, consumption of good x has become less costly to the environment, and 
yet society chooses a lower level of consumption of good x and a higher level of consumption of good y, 
which has now become relatively more environmentally costly.  If we focus on consumption alone, there is 
little to explain why this should occur, but the dynamic nature of the system can confound otherwise 
intuitive predictions.  Table 4d indicates that a decrease in the pollution intensity of industry x causes 
capital to be shifted away from industry x and into industry y, indicating that consumption of good x will 
decrease.  When industry y becomes more pollution intensive, consumption of y decreases, which is 





Table 4b    






Increase γx from 0.4 to 0.41 0.5195 0.5222 ( + ) 
Increase γy from 0.3 to 0.31 0.5195 0.5216 ( + ) 
Increase A from 0.6 to 0.61 0.5195 0.5333 ( + ) 
Decrease σ1 from 0.22 to 0.21 0.5195 0.5194 ( - ) 
Increase σ2 from 0.13 to 0.14 0.5195 0.5195 even 
Decrease η from 0.9 to 0.5 0.5195 0.5195 even 
Increase b0 from 0.01 to 0.011 0.5195 0.5192 ( - ) 
Increase b1 from 0.01 to 0.011 0.5195 0.5193 ( - ) 
Increase b2 from 2 to 2.1 0.5195 0.5194 ( - ) 
Increase α1 from 0.3 to 0.31 0.5195 0.5253 ( + ) 
Decrease α2 from 0.5 to 0.495 0.5195 0.5214 ( + ) 
Increase δ1 from 0.1 to 0.11 0.5195 0.4984 ( - ) 
Increase δ2 from 0.1 to 0.2 0.5195 0.519 ( - ) 




Table 4c    






Increase γx from 0.4 to 0.41 0.44 0.4385 ( - ) 
Increase γy from 0.3 to 0.31 0.44 0.4443 ( + ) 
Increase A from 0.6 to 0.61 0.44 0.4505 ( + ) 
Decrease σ1 from 0.22 to 0.21 0.44 0.4401 ( + ) 
Increase σ2 from 0.13 to 0.14 0.44 0.4399 ( - ) 
Decrease η from 0.9 to 0.5 0.44 0.44 even 
Increase b0 from 0.01 to 0.011 0.44 0.4394 ( - ) 
Increase b1 from 0.01 to 0.011 0.44 0.4401 ( + ) 
Increase b2 from 2 to 2.1 0.44 0.4401 ( + ) 
Increase α1 from 0.3 to 0.31 0.44 0.4382 ( - ) 
Decrease α2 from 0.5 to 0.495 0.44 0.4393 ( - ) 
Increase δ1 from 0.1 to 0.11 0.44 0.423 ( - ) 
Increase δ2 from 0.1 to 0.2 0.44 0.4407 ( + ) 
. iii  
 
 
As b0 increases, consumption of both goods declines, as was predicted, yet an increase in either b1 
or b2 causes an increase in consumption of good y and a decrease in consumption of good x.  This disparity 
arises out of the strength of secondary effects; as b1 increases, the variable costs of abatement are 
increasing, which creates stronger substitution effects and causes society to substitute out of the dirty good, 





Table 4d    






Increase γx from 0.4 to 0.41 0.3574 0.3623 ( + ) 
Increase γy from 0.3 to 0.31 0.3574 0.3481 ( - ) 
Increase A from 0.6 to 0.61 0.3574 0.3575 ( + ) 
Decrease σ1 from 0.22 to 0.21 0.3574 0.3573 ( - ) 
Increase σ2 from 0.13 to 0.14 0.3574 0.3575 ( + ) 
Decrease η from 0.9 to 0.5 0.3574 0.3574 even 
Increase b0 from 0.01 to 0.011 0.3574 0.3574 even 
Increase b1 from 0.01 to 0.011 0.3574 0.3571 ( - ) 
Increase b2 from 2 to 2.1 0.3574 0.3572 ( - ) 
Increase α1 from 0.3 to 0.31 0.3574 0.3637 ( + ) 
Decrease α2 from 0.5 to 0.495 0.3574 0.3595 ( + ) 
Increase δ1 from 0.1 to 0.11 0.3574 0.3544 ( - ) 
Increase δ2 from 0.1 to 0.2 0.3574 0.3562 ( - ) 
. iv  
 
 
changes, reducing the cost of abatement, and yet the result is the same as an increase in b1, which represents 
an increase in the cost of abatement.  An increase in the convexity of the abatement cost function will have 
less of an impact on the cost of abatement in industry x, due to the fact that abatement in industry x is near 
1, as shown in Table 4e.  In industry y, however, abatement is lower, so raising it to a higher power reduces 
the abatement cost more dramatically.  Because abatement is now less costly in industry y than in industry 
x, consumption of good y is now less costly than consumption of good x, and society appears to make the 
choice to substitute out of x and into y. 
An increase in the capital depreciation rate yields the expected result, as it becomes much harder 
to maintain the same level of capital.  A reduction in the level of capital leads to a reduction in output and, 
therefore, consumption.  A decrease in the pollution assimilation rate leads to a decrease in consumption of 
x and an increase in consumption of good y.  As noted above with regard to the cost function c vexity 
parameter, a change in the cost of abatement is not felt evenly in both industries.  That disparity leads 
society to substitute out of consumption of x and into consumption of y.  Society reacts to the increase in 
the depreciation rate by choosing to take advantage of the lower cost of production by saving more of it for 





Table 4e    






Increase γx from 0.4 to 0.41 0.973 0.9777 ( + ) 
Increase γy from 0.3 to 0.31 0.973 0.9769 ( + ) 
Increase A from 0.6 to 0.61 0.973 0.9974 ( + ) 
Decrease σ1 from 0.22 to 0.21 0.973 0.9309 ( - ) 
Increase σ2 from 0.13 to 0.14 0.973 0.9737 ( + ) 
Decrease η from 0.9 to 0.5 0.973 0.973 even 
Increase b0 from 0.01 to 0.011 0.973 0.9715 ( - ) 
Increase b1 from 0.01 to 0.011 0.973 0.8888 ( - ) 
Increase b2 from 2 to 2.1 0.973 0.9344 ( - ) 
Increase α1 from 0.3 to 0.31 0.973 0.9086 ( - ) 
Decrease α2 from 0.5 to 0.495 0.973 0.9989 ( + ) 
Increase δ1 from 0.1 to 0.11 0.973 0.9352 ( - ) 




4.3.2.3.  Stationary state for capital allocation 
 
 As parameters change, the optimal levels of consumption and production of the clean and dirty 
goods will also change, leading the social planner to change the allocation of capital between industrie .  
For example, as the productivity of capital in eithr industry increases, the value of capital within that 
industry increases, and we would expect that the social planner would shift capital into that industry in 
order to take advantage of the increased productivity.  As technology increases, and capital becomes more 
productive, the value of capital, generally, would increase, which could lead society to desire a greate  
amount of capital.  Because the only way to increase the capital stock is to produce more of good y, so we 
would predict that the value of ∆ would decrease, since ∆ represents the portion of capital stock in industry 
x.  We note, however, that income effects may dominate, in that the increased efficiency of capital allows 
for the same output at lower levels of capital, so that investment in future capital is not as essential, leading 
to a higher value of ∆. 
As the pollution intensity parameters in each industry increase, the cost of allocating capital to that
industry increases, so as industry x yields higher levels of pollution, we would expect less capital in 
industry x.  Conversely, as industry y yields higher levels of pollution, we would expect more capital in 




such changes impact abatement in both industries in the same way.  However, increasing costs of 
abatement mean that the cost of using capital has increased, so we would expect that there might be a slight 
increase in capital being allocated to industry x.  As society receives greater utility from a particular good, 
we would predict that the social planner would shift production to that industry.  An increase in the capital 
depreciation rate means that society is losing capital at a faster rate, so we would predict that the social 
planner would shift more capital away from industry x, and towards industry , where it can be invested in 
future capital accumulation.  Finally,  an increase in the pollution assimilation rate means that the cost of 
using capital in production has decreased, so we would expect to see a shift of capital to industry y, where it 
can be invested in future capital.  
 By looking at Table 4d, we again see that our results are mixed.  As each individual industry 
becomes more productive, capital shifts to that industry, as predicted.  As capital becomes generally more 
efficient, however, society shifts more production nto industry x.  The value of capital has increased, but 
instead of shifting more capital towards industry y, where more capital can be accumulated, the social 
planner shifts capital to the industry which promises greater current consumption.  Recall, however, that 
these results are for the stationary state, not the im  path.  The increased efficiency of capital has allowed 
society to accumulate more capital over time, shown in Table 4a, indicating that allocation to industry y 
was higher along the optimal time path, settling down to a lower stationary state level that allows for 
greater utility from greater consumption of x.  
 Decreasing the pollution intensity in industry x decreases the cost of allocating capital to industry 
x, but society chooses to shift capital away from industry x and to industry y.  However, when industry  
becomes more pollution intensive, the social planner shifts more capital towards industry x.  In both 
circumstances, allocating capital to industry y has become relatively more costly to the environment, and 
yet seemingly equivalent stimuli result in different outcomes.   
Increasing the fixed cost of abatement yields no change in capital allocation, but increasing the 
variable cost of abatement and the convexity of the cost function both result in a shift towards industry y.  
Increasing the variable cost affects both industrie in the same way, but a change in the convexity of the 




of abatement increases as abatement approaches 1.  Increasing the convexity amplifies the effect, so that 
the marginal cost of abatement in industry x, which has an abatement level near 1, is much greater than the 
marginal cost of abatement in industry y, where abatement is relatively low.  As it becomes increasingly 
more costly to produce good x in an environmentally friendly way, society shifts production away from 
industry x. 
The remaining parameter changes yield the predicted results.  When society receives relatively 
more utility from consuming x, either because of an increase in α1 or a decrease in α2, the social planner 
shifts more capital to production of x.  When capital depreciates at a faster rate, the social planner shifts 
capital to industry y, where it can be invested in future capital stock, and when pollution assimilates faster, 
society shifts capital to industry , in order to accumulate more capital since using capital is less 
environmentally costly.  
 
4.3.2.4.  Stationary state for abatement 
 
We turn next to the effect of parameter changes on the level of abatement in either industry.  An 
increase in the productivity factor of either good should increase the amount of income that society has to 
spend on either consumption, investment, or abatement.  That increase in income should allow the social 
planner to choose a higher level of abatement in the industry in which the productivity increase is realized.  
The same amount of capital now generates more output, and some of that potential output can be utilized, 
instead, in abatement, leading to the same level of output but with a lower level of emissions.  
Alternatively, the social planner may also reallocate capital between industries, so that society can achieve 
increased abatement in the industry that has not seen an increase in productivity.  An increase in technology 
will allow for greater output in both industries, and that increase may be spent on increased abatement in 
both industries. 
A slightly different choice faces society when the pollution intensity of each industry changes.  As 
more pollution is produced for the same level of output, society may desire to reduce pollution, but it may 
do it through abatement in either industry.  It may decide to engage in abatement in the industry that is now 
a greater source of pollution, or it may decide that t e cheaper method of abating pollution is through 




cleaner.  As the fixed and variable costs of abatement increase, we would predict that the amount of 
abatement in both industries would decline, and an increase in the convexity parameter would decrease the 
marginal cost of abatement over most of the reasonable values of ux and uy, so that we would expect an 
increase in abatement in both industries. 
As society begins to receive greater utility from consumption of goods x or y, there will tend to be 
an increase in demand for those goods, which creates a disincentive to abate in the industry that produces 
the good from which society now receives a greater level of utility.  There will also be a correspondig 
disincentive to engage in abatement efforts in the industry that produces the good for which society’s 
preferences have remained constant.  The latter disincentive arises out of the fact that society’s increased 
demand for one good means a corresponding decrease in the utility society gains from a clean environment.  
As the capital depreciation rate increases, we would expect that the social planner would decrease 
abatement, especially in industry y, so that more output would be available to replenish the stock of capital.  
Finally, as the pollution assimilation rate increass, the value of engaging in abatement declines, for the 
environment’s natural capacity to eliminate pollution on its own has increased.  We would therefore predict 
that abatement would decline in both industries.  
By looking at Tables 4e and 4f, we see that, in this case, an increase in γx results in society 
choosing to spend the additional resources on higher lev ls of abatement in industry x, achieving desired 
reductions in pollution in that industry while increasing consumption of x, as shown in Table 4b.  The 
additional productivity is not used to increase abatement in industry y, but Table 4g indicates that total 
pollution has declined, so the reduction in abatement in industry y is more than offset by the increase in 
abatement in industry x.  An increase in γy results in an increase in abatement in both industries, indicating 
that society makes the choice to expend some of its additional resources on achieving a cleaner 
environment in both industries.  A similar result is achieved as an increase in technology results in greater 
income, which society chooses to expend on greater abatement in both industries.  
 A decrease in the pollution intensity of industry x leads to an increase in abatement in industry y, 
and a decrease in abatement in industry x, as industry y is now the relatively higher polluter.  In other 





Table 4f    






Increase γx from 0.4 to 0.41 0.2979 0.2969 ( - ) 
Increase γy from 0.3 to 0.31 0.2979 0.3009 ( + ) 
Increase A from 0.6 to 0.61 0.2979 0.3048 ( + ) 
Decrease σ1 from 0.22 to 0.21 0.2979 0.2985 ( + ) 
Increase σ2 from 0.13 to 0.14 0.2979 0.3211 ( + ) 
Decrease η from 0.9 to 0.5 0.2979 0.298 ( + ) 
Increase b0 from 0.01 to 0.011 0.2979 0.2975 ( - ) 
Increase b1 from 0.01 to 0.011 0.2979 0.2722 ( - ) 
Increase b2 from 2 to 2.1 0.2979 0.3185 ( + ) 
Increase α1 from 0.3 to 0.31 0.2979 0.2828 ( - ) 
Decrease α2 from 0.5 to 0.495 0.2979 0.3075 ( + ) 
Increase δ1 from 0.1 to 0.11 0.2979 0.2868 ( - ) 
Increase δ2 from 0.1 to 0.2 0.2979 0.1794 ( - ) 
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Table 4g    






Increase γx from 0.4 to 0.41 0.6171 0.6126 ( - ) 
Increase γy from 0.3 to 0.31 0.6171 0.6208 ( + ) 
Increase A from 0.6 to 0.61 0.6171 0.5973 ( - ) 
Decrease σ1 from 0.22 to 0.21 0.6171 0.6611 ( + ) 
Increase σ2 from 0.13 to 0.14 0.6171 0.6403 ( + ) 
Decrease η from 0.9 to 0.5 0.6171 0.6171 even 
Increase b0 from 0.01 to 0.011 0.6171 0.6188 ( + ) 
Increase b1 from 0.01 to 0.011 0.6171 0.7346 ( + ) 
Increase b2 from 2 to 2.1 0.6171 0.6439 ( + ) 
Increase α1 from 0.3 to 0.31 0.6171 0.7045 ( + ) 
Decrease α2 from 0.5 to 0.495 0.6171 0.5794 ( - ) 
Increase δ1 from 0.1 to 0.11 0.6171 0.6504 ( + ) 
Increase δ2 from 0.1 to 0.2 0.6171 0.5782 ( - ) 
. vii  
 
 
industry that is relatively higher polluting.  An icrease in the pollution intensity of industry y, however, 
leads society to increase abatement in both industries.  Of course, it is possible to think of increasing the 
pollution intensity of y as equivalent to decreasing the pollution intensity of x, and to expect similar results 
from both.  The results shown in Tables 4e and 4f indicate that such expectations in a complex system may 




The predicted reaction to increases in the fixed and variable costs of abatement are realized, in that 
increased costs of abatement result in decreased abatement.  As the convexity of the cost function 
increases, however, abatement in industry x decreases, but abatement in industry y increases.  As discussed 
above, an increase in the convexity of the abatement cost function means that the marginal cost of 
abatement is decreasing in abatement.  Abatement in industry x is already almost complete, while 
abatement in industry  is still relatively low, resulting in greater poten ial for cost savings by increasing 
abatement in industry .  If abatement is going to be increased in industry y, society can reduce abatement 
in industry x by some amount and still enjoy the same level of environmental quality. 
As α1 increases, we see the predicted results materializ, with a decrease in the abatement level 
achieved in both industries, which allows for higher n t production of x to be consumed.  As α2 decreases, 
society chooses a higher level of abatement in bothindustries.  Any decrease in the consumption utility 
parameters results in an increase in the utility share for a clean environment.  Thus, as society gains less 
utility from consumption of y, it increases abatement in order to gain more of what it now values at a 
relatively higher rate, environmental quality.  Increases in the capital depreciation rate, and the pollution 
assimilation rate cause abatement in both industries o decline, as predicted, and in response to the higher 
cost and lower benefit of abatement. 
 
4.3.2.5.  Stationary state for pollution 
 
 The impact of parameter changes on emissions will be discussed below, but it is also important to 
look at the impact on the stock of pollution, as well.  Increases in productivity would be expected to give 
rise to an increase in output, with the possible increase in investment, and therefore even greater production 
in the future, with corresponding increases in pollution.  The same result can be expected from an increase 
in technology.  Of course society’s preference for a clean environment must be taken into account, and 
some amount of the increased wealth will almost assuredly be spent on environmental improvements 
through abatement.  Ex ante, it is impossible to know whether or not the increas d abatement expenditures 
will be enough to offset the increase in production which we expect. 
 Increased pollution intensity would be expected to increase pollution as well, as the same 




resources on abatement, but it is unlikely that society will be willing to expend sufficient resources to 
maintain the same level of pollution.  Because consumption and a clean environment are complementary 
goods, we would expect some new equilibrium at some lev l of pollution greater than the original 
stationary state level.  As the cost of abatement increases, whether fixed or variable costs, abatement should 
decrease and pollution rise, and as the abatement cost function becomes more convex, abatement should 
increase and pollution go down. 
 Increased utility from consumption should lead to lower abatement and, therefore, higher 
pollution, as society values a clean environment less, both in absolute and relative terms.  As capital 
depreciates at a faster rate, society must rebalance its mix of consumption and a clean environment in order 
to maintain a stable stock of capital.  Increased investment will likely reduce both consumption and 
abatement, so we would expect that pollution would increase.  As pollution assimilates faster into the 
environment, we would expect that the level of pollution would drop.  There may be additional, less direct 
reasons for why pollution would decline in the stationary state, but the simplest explanation is simply that 
more of it is disposed of by the environment in every time period, making it harder to build up pollution 
stock, even if society desired a higher stationary state level of pollution. 
 Many of the predicted results for stationary state pollution were realized but not all.  Table 4g 
shows that an increase in the productivity of industry x and an increase in technology result in lower 
pollution over time, while an increase in the productivity of industry y yields an increase in pollution.  This 
may seem odd that an increase in the productivity of the green industry yields a higher level of pollution, 
but an increase in the productivity of y also increases the possibilities for investment in future capital 
stocks.  Society is willing to expend some of the additional income it receives from the productivity boost 
or technological advance on abatement, enough to counter the potential for increased pollution, but it is 
unwilling to sacrifice too much investment. 
 Decreased pollution intensity in industry x causes an increase in pollution, as society pulls back on 
abatement in the dirty good, shown in Table 4e.  Increased pollution intensity in industry y increases 
pollution as expected.  Increases in fixed and variable costs of abatement also increase pollution, as 




pollution, as the resulting decrease in abatement in industry x outweighs the increase in abatement in 
industry y.  Increased utility from consumption of x leads to increased pollution, as abatement decreases in 
response to a decline in utility from a clean environment.  A decrease in utility from consumption of y 
means higher utility from a clean environment and corresponding lower pollution.  Increased capital 
depreciation leads to increased pollution as society is forced to increase output in order to maintain a stable 
capital stock.  Increased pollution assimilation leads to lower abatement, as shown in Table 4f, but the 
natural ability of the environment to dispose of pollution more than compensates for the decreased 
abatement.  
 Of course, one of the things which the previous chapter revealed is that a discussion of stationary 
state values is only half of the story, for it is possible that the time paths, pre- and post-parameter change, 
may cross at some point during the time period of the simulation.  Therefore, we now turn to an analysis of 
the time paths.  
 
4.3.3.  Optimal time paths 
 
After solving for the stationary state, Matlab is capable of deriving an optimal path from the initial 
values of k0 = 0.5 and m0 = 0 to the stationary state values described in the above tables, and using the 
parameter values described in Table 3.  Once the optimal time paths for all variables have been derived, we 
can determine the optimal level of emissions for every level of capital by using the equation: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )tytyyttxtxxtt kFukFue ∆−−+∆−= 111 σσ   (4.13) 
Fig. 4a shows the optimal emissions path, and Fig. 4b shows the optimal pollution path.  The emissions 
path shows the upside-down U shape characteristic of an Environmental Kuznets Curve, similar to the 
results of the previous chapter.  Unlike the previous chapter, however, the quadratic form of the polluti n 
curve is not as pronounced.  For most of the time path, pollution appears to be monotonically increasing, 
and it is only as society approaches the stationary state that the pollution curve appears to be reaching its 
peak.48  Emissions are decreasing as capital increases, yet the low assimilation rate means that pollution  
                                                
 48 Note that this phenomenon is not the same as that described by Lieb (2004).  Lieb described stock 
pollutants as increasing monotonically, while flow pollutants exhibited EKC properties.  While Figs. 4a and 4b are the 
flow and stock of pollution in the model, they are different ways of measuring a single pollutant.  Lieb, on the other 
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Fig. 4b.  Pollution path.  





remains in the environment for a relatively long time, so that pollution plateaus at the same time, and at 
approximately the same rate as capital, resulting in the path exhibited in Fig. 4b.  
The optimal time paths of the other variables are also informative and are represented in Figs. 5a 
through 5e.  Fig. 5a shows consumption of both goods rising rapidly to their stationary state, with 
consumption of x remaining at a higher level than consumption of y.  Consumption of x stabilizes at 0.5195, 
and consumption of y stabilizes at 0.44.  This higher level of consumption of x is partially explained by the 
higher utility gained from consumption of x, as well as the need to forego consumption of y in order to 
invest in future capital.  Those effects are countered somewhat by the increased harm to the environment 
from production of x. Fig. 5b shows abatement in both industries, rising to their stationary state, with 
abatement in industry x settling at a much higher level, 0.973, than abatement in industry y, 0.2979.  This 
disparity is explained by the higher pollution intesity in industry x, with society choosing to expend more 
to make the dirty good less environmentally destructive.  Fig. 5c shows the time path of pollution and the 
shadow value of a clean environment.  As pollution r ses quickly and stabilizes at its stationary state level, 
the shadow value of a clean environment also rises and stabilizes.  The time path for the shadow value is 
quite flat, even flatter than in the previous chapter.  This is explained by the fact that m , the carrying 
capacity of the environment, is much higher in this society than that represented in the previous chapter.  
Fig. 5d shows the time path of capital and the shadow value of capital.  Capital reaches its stationary state 
level of 1.9522 at approximately half way through the otal time span of the simulation.  Fig. 5e shows the 
time path of capital allocation, with the allocation shifting quickly until approximately one-third ofcapital 
is allocated to production of x.  
 
4.3.4.  Effect of parameter change 
 
 As the discussion above demonstrated, a change in the values of the parameters can have 
unexpected impacts on the variables.  Figs. 6a through 6m show the effect of those parameter changes on 
the emissions path.  Note that there may be seeming disparities in the shape of the initial emissions curve.  
These disparities are merely the result of changes in the range of the x-axis and y-axis, in order to 







Fig. 5a.  Time path of optimal consumption of x and y.  
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Fig. 5c.  Time path of optimal pollution and shadow value of a clean environment.  
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Fig. 5d.  Time path of optimal capital and shadow value of capital.  
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We turn first to an increase in productivity in industry x.  We know from the discussion above 
that, in the stationary state, such an increase results in higher levels of capital, a higher percentage of that 
capital being allocated to industry x, with a corresponding increase in consumption of x, but also an 
increase in abatement in industry x. We also know that consumption of y declines, likely because society 
invests more of good y in future capital, which is apparently then shifted o industry x to take advantage of 
the increased productivity.  As we discovered in the previous chapter, however, simply because there is a 
particular change in the stationary state level does not mean that the entire time path shifts in that direction.  
Any or all of the variables then could have been higher during the transition to the stationary state, yet the 
variable could have settled down to a lower stationry state than before the change.   
, 
When it comes to emissions, we would expect that the increase in productivity in industry x would 
increase emissions, as more capital is shifted to industry x, which has a higher pollution intensity.  Fig. 6a 
shows emissions curves before and after the increase.  The initial reaction is a decrease in emissions, which 
later turns into an increase in emissions at peak lvels of emissions, but then shifting again to a decrease in 
emissions at the far right of the emissions curve.  This latter phenomenon is difficult to see from Fig. 6a, so 
we amplify the far right section of the emissions curve in Fig. 6b.  That the emissions curves cross not 
once, but twice, is unexpected, yet can be explained by remembering that in order to make the best use of 
the increased productivity in x, the social planner will shift more production initially to y, in order to 
accumulate sufficient capital that more capital may be allocated to industry x.  Once more capital has been 
accumulated, it is shifted to industry x, and pollution rises to a higher peak.  That higher peak, however, 
triggers higher abatement in industry x, so that society is able to achieve a lower station ry state level of 
emissions. 
We turn next to an increase in productivity in industry y.  From our discussion above, we know 
that an increase in the productivity of capital in industry y will result in an increase in consumption of both 
x and y in the stationary state, as the increase in productivity allows for greater investment.  That 
investment yields higher levels of capital, which allows for greater consumption, but also greater abatement 




However, we also know that the stationary state level of pollution is actually higher under a higher 
productivity in industry y, which means we should be cautious in making any predictions. 
 As the productivity of capital in industry y is increased, there is an initial decrease in emission , 
but a higher level of emissions in the long run.  Note, however, that the increase in emissions in the 
stationary state is not as great as the increase in total emissions over time, because the increase in capital 
stock shifts the emissions curve out.  At every level of capital, emissions are higher, but emissions settle to 
a similar level in the stationary state.  Because industry y is the only industry whose output can be used to 
invest in future capital, an increase in productivity may cause, over time, an increase in capital formation.  
An increase in productivity in industry y will cause a shift in capital to industry y, which initially will result 
in lower emissions, since production of good y is less pollution intensive.  However, a constant increase in 
production leads to an increase in the total capital s ock, which allows for greater production and 
consumption of both goods.  An increase in production of good x is thus facilitated, which results in an 
increase in emissions along the optimal path. 
By turning to an increase in technology, we know that we will see an increase in the stationary 
state level of capital, as well as increases in consumption of x and y and abatement in industries x and y.  In 
essence, an increase in technology increases the effici ncy of capital, essentially boosting societal income, 
allowing society to realize increases in consumption while also paying for increased abatement to protect 
the environment, which is the other source of utility for society.  Ex ante, it is difficult to know whether the 
rising pollution from increased production of x and y will be effectively countered by the increase in 
abatement. 
Fig. 6d indicates that, initially, society produces at a higher level, which yields higher levels of 
emissions.  Society reaches a higher peak of emission , which yields an increase in society’s valuation of 
environmental quality, and leads to the increased abatement in both industries.  Thus, while society raches 
a higher peak, the stationary state level of emissions are lower and at a higher level of capital. 
We turn next to a decrease in pollution intensity in industry x.  As industry x becomes relatively 
more environmentally friendly, we would expect emissions to decrease.  However, from our discussion 




decreasing consumption of x and increasing consumption of y, even though the relative environmental 
quality characteristics of the two goods have been shifted in favor of  x.  The social planner does choose to 
decrease abatement in industry x and increase abatement in industry y, and the stationary state level of 
pollution increases.  
Fig. 6e shows an increase in emissions with a decrease in σx; the increase in emissions coincides 
with the increase in stationary state levels of polluti n shown in Table 4g.  With a decrease in pollution 
intensity of production of x, society chooses lower abatement, which results in higher emissions in the long 
run, although at low levels of capital emissions are ctually higher. 
Further complicating the analysis are the results from an increase in the pollution intensity of 
industry y.  These results illustrate with greater clarity the potential perils of making intuitive assumptions 
without further verification.  An increase in the pollution intensity of industry y and a decrease in the 
pollution intensity of industry x shift the relative environmental benefits of the two industries in the same 
direction.  A comparison of Figs. 6e and 6f show that t e general trend in emissions is the same from the 
two changes, although the results depicted in the rel vant portions of Tables 4a through 4g show that 
society takes a different route to the same destinatio .  The one fundamental difference in the emission  
curve is that society experiences lower emissions levels at the initial portions of the emissions curve with a 
decrease in pollution intensity of industry x.  
Fig. 6f shows an increase in emissions even as society hooses higher levels of abatement in both 
industries, indicating that society desires to counter the increased pollution intensity with increased 
abatement, but that increased abatement is not sufficient to effectively counter the increased pollution 
intensity.  It does, however, require that society give up a portion of the stationary state capital sock, as 
shown in Table 4a. 
By turning to a decrease in η, this represents a decrease in the complementarity between goods.  
Most importantly for the purposes of this discussion, it represents a decrease in the complementarity 
between consumption and a clean environment.  From our discussion above, we know that the only impact 
a decrease in complementarity has in the stationary state is an increase in abatement in industry y.  




choice of increased abatement in industry y appears to be greater along the emissions path than it is at the 
stationary state, since the emissions curves before and after the decrease in complementarity converge to 
the original stationary state level of emissions.  
We next address an increase in the fixed cost of abatement, which we know will result in a 
decrease in abatement in both industries, as well as decreases in consumption of x and y.  That is an 
indication that society would like to maintain the same level of environmental quality and is willing to 
sacrifice some amount of consumption in an attempt to stay as close as possible to the original levels of 
abatement.  Because this is an increase in the fixed cost of abatement, rather than variable cost, the cost 
does not increase with the level of abatement, so society must incur an additional cost so long as some 
positive level of abatement is to be chosen.  Society cannot maintain the same level of environmental 
quality, and the stationary state level of pollution ncreases as a result, but it is not as dramatic an increase 
in pollution as we would expect with an increase in the variable cost of abatement.  We would anticipate 
that the emissions curve would shift up, and looking at Fig. 6h, we see that is precisely what has occurred.  
The change is not dramatic, indicating that society may have been mostly successful in maintaining a 
constant level of environmental quality.  The biggest change is the stationary state level of capital, as 
abatement cost increases, as at least a portion of the additional cost comes at the expense of investment, 
rather than consumption and abatement.  
 Increasing the variable cost of abatement has many of the same impacts as an increase in the fixed 
cost of abatement.  The primary difference from our previous discussion of the stationary state levels is that 
an increase in the variable cost of abatement causes a hift in production and consumption to good y.  The 
reason behind this result is that a shift from the dirty good to the clean good is an imperfect substitute for 
abatement, in that a shift of one unit of capital from industry x to industry y will yield lower gross 
emissions.  Of course, this does not take into account the fact that abatement is much higher in industry x, 
but it is an attempt by society to achieve a cleaner e vironment by alternative means as abatement becom s 
more costly. 
By looking at Fig. 6i, we see that emissions increase much more significantly after an increase in 




discussed previously, because an increase in the fixed cost just increases the choice of engaging in any 
level of abatement, whereas an increase in the variable cost of abatement increases the marginal cost of 
abatement at every level of abatement.  
 We next turn to an increase in the convexity of the abatement cost function, which, as discussed 
previously, indicates that the abatement cost functio  slopes upward at a less severe rate.  This effectively 
reduces the marginal cost of abatement at low rates of abatement, while increasing the marginal cost of 
abatement as abatement nears complete abatement.  W know that as the abatement cost function becomes 
more convex, the social planner shifts capital intodustry y, allowing increased consumption of y.  This 
shift is a result of the relative costs of abatement in the two industries; abatement in industry x is 
approaching full abatement, which means that the margin l cost of abatement is much higher in x than in y, 
where abatement is approximately 0.3, as shown in Table 4f and Fig. 5b.  A reduction in the level of 
abatement in x and a corresponding increase in the abatement level in y (adjusted to account for the lower 
pollution intensity in industry ) could maintain the same level of environmental quality.  Doing so without 
further changes, however, would alter the relative levels of consumption and environmental quality, and 
virtually assure that society was not at the optimal level of utility.  Because the social planner’s primary 
goal is maximization of utility, she shifts production towards industry  at the same time as abatement in 
industry y is increased. 
 Our initial prediction regarding emissions is that an increase in the convexity of the abatement cost 
function, and corresponding decrease in the marginal cost of abatement, would cause a decrease in 
emissions.  However, the reaction of various variables to the change, especially the fact that increased 
convexity of the abatement cost function results in an increase in the stationary state level of polluti n, 
makes us question the correctness of our initial prediction. 
Fig. 6j shows that the emissions curve exhibits a similar reaction as that demonstrated in 
Chapter 3, in that emissions are initially lower, as predicted, but that the stationary state level of emissions 
are higher, as indicated by the higher stationary state level of pollution.  Society is faced with marginal 
abatement costs that are declining in abatement, which increases the incentives to abate.  Society chooses to 




of time leads to a delay in the rise of the costate v riable for environmental quality.  As a result, we see 
from Table 4d that more production is moved to industry y and abatement is increased in industry y, et 
society lowers its abatement efforts in industry x, and as a result faces higher emissions and pollution levels 
in the stationary state. 
Next, we turn to an increase in α1, the share of utility that arises from consumption of x.  An 
increase in the utility parameter for good x shifts the MRS, making x more attractive relative to y and both 
goods more attractive relative to a clean environment.  We would anticipate that such a shift in the MRS 
would cause an increase in production and consumption of good x, along with a reduction in abatement, 
both of which are consistent with the results seen above.  However, we note that Tables 4a and 4d indicate 
that the stationary state capital stock has increased, and more capital is allocated to industry x.  Because the 
capital stock is increased only as production from industry y is invested in the future capital stock, we know 
that society must have allocated a larger portion of capital to industry y, in order to achieve the higher 
capital stock. 
Fig. 6k shows the expected increase in emissions.  The shift of capital to industry , required for 
the increased stationary state capital stock, does n t decrease emissions even at early stages, indicati g that 
the decrease in abatement in industry y is likely at the earliest stages of development. 
We next turn to a decrease in utility from consumption of y, which alters the MRS, increasing the 
relative importance of a clean environment in society’s utility function.  This should increase abatement in 
both industries and reduce emissions.  The change also increases the relative desirability of consumption of 
x, which could counter, in part, the improvements in environmental quality that we would expect from the
increase in the relative importance of a clean enviro ment.  From the discussion above, we know that the 
stationary state level of pollution decreases after th  change, and the downward pressures on emissions are 
likely stronger.  We also know that the change results in an increase in consumption of x, a decrease in 
consumption of y, and increased abatement in both industries. 
 Fig. 6l confirms our predictions, as emissions decrease over the entire emissions curve.  The 
increase in abatement in industry x appears sufficient to counter the potential for increased emissions as 




 By turning to an increase in the capital depreciation rate, we know from the discussion above that 
the social planner needs to engage in more investment in order to achieve the same level of production and 
consumption.  Capital is shifted away from industry x, because investment cannot come from industry x.  
Consumption of x therefore declines, but so does consumption of y, as more production is needed for 
investment.  Abatement also decreases, as another means to pay for the increased investment.  All of this
would indicate an increase in emissions, as would the fact that the stationary state level of pollution 
increases.   
Fig. 6m shows a downward shift in the emissions curve, although the decrease appears to be 
relatively small.  The stationary state capital stock is significantly lower, as it is impossible to maintain the 
same capital stock in the face of increased depreciation.  That reduction in capital is part of the reason why 
emissions are lower even as abatement declines in both industries.  It may initially appear contradictory that 
the emissions curve shifts down yet the stationary state level of pollution is higher.  However, note that the 
terminal point on the post-change emissions curve in Fig. 6m has both a lower capital level and a higher 
emissions level, so that the higher stationary state level of pollution is not contradictory. 
 Finally, we come to the change in emissions from an increase in the depreciation rate for pollution, 
or the assimilation rate.  As the assimilation rate increases, the benefit of abatement may have decreased, 
because more of what we allow into the environment this period will be taken care of by nature in every 
future period.  Alternatively, if the assimilation rate has increased, then the cost of achieving a cle n 
environment has now decreased, increasing society’s incentive to engage in the effort of achieving that 
cleaner environment.  From the previous discussion, we know that an increase in the assimilation rate 
reduces the stationary state level of abatement in both industries, lending support to the former explanation.  
However, the latter explanation may also have some truth, as the social planner takes other actions to 
achieve a clean environment, shifting capital away from the dirty industry and towards the clean industry.  
This leads to a decrease in consumption of x and an increase in consumption of y and an increase in 
investment.  The reduction in abatement, however, does not result in an increase in the stationary state level 
of pollution, which is the result of an increasing capacity of the environment to assimilate pollution without 




By looking at Figure 6n, we see that an increase in the assimilation rate causes an increase in 
emissions over time, exactly as predicted.  Even thoug  the stationary state level of pollution decreases, 
emissions increase, as a higher percentage of the emissions shown above are readily assimilated into the 
environment.  
 Recall that there were significant predictive difficulties in Chapter 3 with regard to the impact of 
parameter change.  The many uncertainties regarding the reaction of a complex system to a change in a 
single parameter leads to the conclusion that it is only with great care that we should assume universality of 
even the most intuitive assumptions.  This chapter increased the complexity of the system, through the 
inclusion of a second industry with different consumptive and pollution characteristics.  Other changes 
were necessary, such as changes in the baseline paramete  values, but one thing remained consistent from
the previous chapter to this chapter, and that is the uncertainty regarding parameter values.  Even th 
additional analysis that was conducted regarding the impact of parameter values on the stationary state 








would be to changes in parameter values.  Table 5 summarizes our ex ante predictions, as compared with 
the results achieved. 
Table 5 illustrates that, regardless of the intuitive strength of the assumptions we use in analyzing 
these complex systems, there are a number of alterntive conditions under which the common assumptions 
are incorrect.  Although the variation in baseline parameters from Chapter 3 to this chapter preclude a 
simple side-by-side analysis, the results from this c apter’s analysis reveal not only similar uncertainty, but 
also the intriguing result that an increase in γx causes the pre- and post-increase optimal emissions paths to 
cross, not once but twice.  These results urge further caution, and recommend further analysis regarding the 
impact of parameter change.  
 
4.4.  Conclusion 
 Certain trends in U.S. history indicate that indivi uals, advocates, and government entities may be 
beginning to take seriously the potential benefits of a shift towards green production, as described in this 
chapter.  Curbside recycling is becoming more and more commonplace in cities around the United States, 
yet individual and group voluntary efforts to recycle have been around much longer.  The number of 
products proudly proclaiming their use of recycled materials is another example, and even private 




          Change in emissions path 
Parameter changed Predicted Actual 
Increase γx from 0.4 to 0.41 ( + ) ( - ) then ( + ) then ( - ) 
Increase γy from 0.3 to 0.31 ( + ) ( - ) then ( + ) 
Increase A from 0.6 to 0.61 ( + ) ( + ) then ( - ) 
Decrease σ1 from 0.22 to 0.21 ( - ) ( - ) then ( + ) 
Increase σ2 from 0.13 to 0.14 ( + ) ( + ) 
Decrease η from 0.9 to 0.5 ( - ) ( + ) 
Increase b0 from 0.01 to 0.011 ( + ) ( + ) 
Increase b1 from 0.01 to 0.011 ( + ) ( + ) 
Increase b2 from 2 to 2.1 ( - ) ( - ) then ( + ) 
Increase α1 from 0.3 to 0.31 ( + ) ( - ) 
Decrease α2 from 0.5 to 0.495 ( - ) ( - ) 
Increase δ1 from 0.1 to 0.11 ( + ) ( + ) 





larger share of an increasingly environmentally cons ious market.  Advertising campaigns by local and 
state governments encourage water and power conservation.  Many government and non-governmental 
entities have attempted to educate the public as to the potentially devastating consequences of global 
warming that could arise from choosing certain types of consumption.  These efforts can be seen as either 
an attempt to alter society’s preferences for green goods, which in our model is represented by the 
parameter α2, or possibly an attempt to alter society’s general p eferences for a clean environment, roughly 
approximated by the variable φ.  While this model does not allow for external modifications, mid time 
stream, to the parameter or variable values, that does not mean that such modifications are not possible. 
This chapter advances our understanding of the processes by which society chooses both the 
economic and environmental outcomes that they must live with.  It does so by expanding the traditionally 
simple models to include a new alternative in consumption, one that is a substitute, although imperfect, for 
direct abatement efforts.  In addition, it enlightens us as to how changes in parameter values might affect 
the complex economic and environmental systems that produce real-world results.  Efforts by many to alter 
society’s preferences for environmental quality have been successful in recent years, although there is 
reason to suspect (as described by some EKC researchers) that much of the perceived change in preferenc s 
may be merely a change in budgetary constraints, which in turn allow for greater leeway to pursue 
environmental preferences which may have always exited but which took the proverbial “back seat” to 
economic concerns.   
More to the point, these efforts have costs, as well as environmental benefits, and this chapter 
illustrates that our intuitive assumptions regarding which parameters are important in achieving 
environmental improvements may be too narrow.  Policy decisions regarding the environment should be 
made from an educated perspective, and that includes an understanding of all possible routes to obtain the 
desired goal.  The results of this chapter show that there may be previously unemphasized routes.  If these 
routes can achieve desired results without the highpolitical and economic costs that can accompany current 










EKC literature is extensive and multifaceted, starting with simple econometric models that offered 
the first insights into the possibility of an EKC.  Those initial studies have given rise to a wide range of 
theoretical models, static and dynamic, covering everything from household consumption/pollution choices 
to international trade and its impact on local and global pollution levels.  The initial studies have also given 
rise to an even wider range of empirical models, teting the significance of not only the regressors used but 
also the empirical methods employed.  Time series, cross-sectional studies, and panel data have all been
utilized in the search for an answer to the question of whether and how economic growth might be 
beneficial to the environment.  Sadly, in the 24 years since the initial wave of EKC papers, no consensus 
has been reached, and many EKC researchers appear convinced that no consensus is possible. 
 EKC theory holds the promise of being more than merely a theoretical puzzle suitable for debate 
in the halls of academia.  If traditional EKC theory, the modified EKC of Stern (2004), or any number of 
alternate theories that have arisen from EKC theory are correct, then there is potential to achieve greater 
environmental quality while maintaining or improving economic conditions for the world’s populations.  
The ongoing debate has led to a more rigorous application of econometric tools to ever-broadening data 
sets, and has stretched the intellect of interested economists to investigate the various circumstances which 
might give rise to an EKC.  That debate proceeds apace, continuing to yield greater insights, and one hopes 
that the elusive consensus is still possible. 
One thing has been largely missing from the debate, however, close scrutiny of the assumptions 
that have been commonly used to describe the likely reaction of economic and environmental systems to 
changes in various parameters.  Differences exist between pollutants and between countries.  It is possible 
that, within a complex system, the impact of parameter change will vary depending upon the starting 
values.  Far too often that possibility is not expressly considered, yet the possibility that there may be 
significant differences in the parameter values may help explain why researchers arrive at different 
outcomes under reasonably similar circumstances.  It is possible that a consensus has been elusive becaus  




This research has as its primary purpose to show the necessity of taking greater care in assuming 
the universality of common assumptions within the context of a complex system.  Subordinate to that 
purpose, but still important, is to show that emission  can be reduced and the environment improved 
through changes to parameters that do not appear on the surface to be directly linked to environmental 
quality.  Within the simple model of Chapter 3, intuition was shown to be an imperfect tool in predicting 
the reaction of the system to a change in such parameters as technology, abatement cost, and societal 
preferences.  The introduction of a more complicated model in Chapter 4 illustrated that certain steps can 
be taken to improve our understanding of the likely r actions.  An EKC was present, to a greater or lesser 
extent, in each simulation.  More important than merely providing support for the traditional quadratic form 
of the EKC, however, this research shows how important i  is for society to understand the conditions u der 
which it operates.  Society is much more likely to achieve environmental quality in all circumstances if it 
can better understand the likely reactions to changes in production or abatement technology, or in society’s 
preferences for consumption and a clean environment. 
 This research is not intended as any form of final answer, but rather to focus attention on a 
previously unheralded area of EKC research.  Also important, it offers strong advice to societies who wish 
to improve their environmental quality and to understand their own circumstances before assuming that 
what worked for other countries will necessarily work if applied universally.  Technologies will differ 
across countries and,possibly,even intranationally across regions.  So, too, will the assimilative capacities 
of various ecosystems, especially as they interact with different forms of pollution.  These differences may 
be substantial obstacles in achieving the desired environmental improvements if a country simply models 
its programs after the successful programs of another country without conducting further analysis. 
A consensus as to the validity of EKC theory may lie far into the future, but further progress 
towards that consensus can be facilitated as considerat on is given to the principles stated in this re earch, 
that seeming opposite results may not be the result of failure on the part of one or other researcher, but 
rather differences in the parameter values associated with the particular pollutant, country, or region being 
analyzed.  EKC models will, and should, become increasingly complex, further incorporating the 




complicate an understanding of how parameter change impacts predicted outcomes.  However, if given 
serious consideration, it should be possible, with time, to identify ranges over which general assumptions 
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